United Nations S/2007/92

Security Council

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15 February 2007
English
Original: French

Letter dated 13 February 2007 from the Permanent Representative of France to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

I write in my capacity as Chairman of the Security Council Working Group on children and armed conflict established by resolution 1612 (2005).

At its seventh meeting, on 9 February 2007, the Working Group adopted its conclusions with respect to the report of the Secretary-General on children and armed conflict in Burundi (S/2006/851 and Corr.1).

I should be grateful if this text could be issued as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Jean-Marc **de La Sablière**

07-24179 (E) 200207 200207

Annex to the letter dated 13 February 2007 from the Permanent Representative of France to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

[Original: English]

Security Council Working Group on children and armed conflict Conclusions on parties to the situation of armed conflict in Burundi

1. At its 6th meeting, on 8 November 2006, the Working Group examined a report of the Secretary-General on children and armed conflict in Burundi, introduced by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General. The Permanent Representative of Burundi participated in the subsequent discussion.

2. The main elements of the exchange of views among the Working Group were the following:

- The Secretary-General's analysis and recommendations contained in the report met with a favourable response.
- The Permanent Representative of Burundi explained that his Government's strategy to improve the situation of children had been to focus, after 13 years of conflict that had torn the country apart, on the achievement of a peace agreement with Palipehutu-FNL and on the development of legislation and positive measures for child protection and education; he recognized that progress still had to be made in areas such as the implementation of legal and justice system reform, awareness on the rights of the child, and the fight against impunity; the Government of Burundi is determined to improve the situation, is open to dialogue with the United Nations on child rights, and hopes that the international community will continue to support activities in the field of children's disarmament, demobilization and reintegration.
- The Chairman summed up the discussion by recognizing that Burundi is at a crucial phase of its transition from conflict to peace. He stated that it is important for the Government of Burundi and the international community to work together to ensure that special attention is given to child protection in the process of demobilization, and that measures are taken to put an end to the culture of impunity.

3. Further to that meeting, the Working Group has agreed to the following:

(a) To appeal to the Government of Burundi and to the Palipehutu-FNL leadership to fully take into account the need to address specifically demobilization of child soldiers and child protection, in close consultation with UNICEF and the United Nations Integrated Office in Burundi, in the implementation of the Comprehensive Ceasefire Agreement.

(b) To share with the Peacebuilding Commission the information contained in the report of the Secretary-General and the conclusions of the Working Group, stressing the need for strategies:

- To address disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of child soldiers

- To raise awareness and support Government action to fight against sexual and other gender-based violence against children, ensure protection and access to justice of victims of such violence, and fight against impunity
- To improve training of police and other security forces in order to prevent violations and abuses of the rights of children by security forces
- To support the valuable work conducted by and strengthen the capacities of the administration office in charge of human rights, judicial authorities and the office of the military prosecutor in the protection of the rights of the child.

(c) Letter from the President of the Security Council to the Government of Burundi, expressing concern about the situation in the demobilization camp of Randa, as described in the report of the Secretary-General, the need to transfer immediately any remaining child soldiers to other facilities for swift release, and welcoming recent steps taken by the Government of Burundi in this regard.

(d) Letter from the Chairman of the Working Group bringing to the attention of United Nations agencies and donor Governments the need to support strengthened and accelerated implementation of sustainable disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programmes in Burundi, in close cooperation with civil society and local communities, paying particular attention in this process to separation of children from adults, and to girls exploited by armed forces and groups.

(e) To recommend the Secretary-General and the Security Council, when discussing issues concerning Burundi, to preserve and strengthen the framework in place for the protection of children, including its capacity to protect girls from rape and other forms of sexual violence.

(f) Letter from the Chairman of the Working Group to the Secretary-General welcoming the intention of its Special Representative for Children and Armed Conflict to visit Burundi.

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Letter dated 13 February 2007 from the Permanent Representative of France to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

I write in my capacity as Chairman of the Security Council Working Group on children and armed conflict established by resolution 1612 (2005).

At its 7th meeting, on 9 February 2007, the Working Group adopted its conclusions with respect to the report of the Secretary-General on children and armed conflict in Côte d'Ivoire (S/2006/835).

I should be grateful if this text could be issued as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Jean-Marc **de La Sablière**

07-24185 (E) 200207 200207

Annex to the letter dated 13 February 2007 from the Permanent Representative of France to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

[Original: English]

Security Council Working Group on children and armed conflict Conclusions on Côte d'Ivoire

1. At its 6th meeting, on 8 November 2006, the Working Group examined a report of the Secretary-General on children and armed conflict in Côte d'Ivoire, introduced by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General. The Permanent Representative of Côte d'Ivoire participated in the subsequent discussion.

2. The main elements of the exchange of views among the members of the Working Group were as follows:

- The report of the Secretary-General and the close engagement of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, UNICEF and ONUCI with all parties on the ground were welcomed.
- Concern was expressed at incidents of grave child rights violations as identified in the Secretary-General's report, including killing, maiming, and the use and abduction of and trafficking in children by parties to armed conflict.
- Persistent incidents of rape and other sexual violence against girls was a cause of grave disturbance.
- Grave concern was expressed that these serious violations committed against children are generally not investigated or prosecuted.
- The recent commitments made by the Forces nouvelles and several self-defence militias in western Côte d'Ivoire, through the recent signing of action plans to end the recruitment and use of child soldiers, were commended.
- The responsibility of the Ivorian authorities to engage other armed groups under their control to enter in a similar dialogue was underlined.
- The Permanent Representative of Côte d'Ivoire underlined that only non-governmental forces or pro-governmental self-defence militias had been involved in the recruitment and use of child soldiers. He agreed on the necessity of further identification of those militias and said that cooperation between them and the National Programme of Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration should be encouraged. Côte d'Ivoire would ratify the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the involvement of children in armed conflict as soon as possible.

3. Further to that meeting and subject to and consistent with applicable international law and relevant Security Council resolutions, including resolution 1612 (2005), the Working Group has agreed to recommend the following to the Security Council:

(a) Letter from the President of the Security Council to the Prime Minister of Côte d'Ivoire welcoming the steps taken to ratify the Optional Protocol to the

Convention on the Rights of the Child on the involvement of children in armed conflict and requesting:

(i) That he makes concrete commitments and takes action to halt and prevent grave violations against children, including through an impartial, transparent and timely investigation of all grave violations of the rights of children with a view to prosecuting their perpetrators;

(ii) That he cooperates with ONUCI and UNICEF in identifying self-defence militias and that he urges those militias to sign action plans to end the recruitment and use of child soldiers, while recalling the Security Council's demand for an immediate resumption of the programme for the disarmament and dismantling of militias throughout the national territory, stressing that this programme is a key element of the peace process and underlining the individual responsibility of the leaders of the militias in the full implementation of this process;

(iii) That those responsible for the implementation of the National Programme of Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration fully cooperate with ONUCI and UNICEF to that end;

(iv) That he speeds up the process of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration in order to facilitate the speedy reintegration of children in their families;

(v) That he puts a regional monitoring mechanism in place in cooperation with the neighbouring States to make sure that during the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process no children are recruited by other rebel groups;

(vi) That he supports and assists in programmes aimed at rehabilitating former child soldiers as well as in the rehabilitation of children affected by the conflict.

(b) Letter from the President of the Security Council to the President of Côte d'Ivoire requesting:

(i) That he makes concrete commitments and takes action to halt and prevent grave violations against children;

(ii) To that end, that he cooperates with ONUCI and UNICEF in identifying still existing self-defence militias.

(c) Letter from the President of the Security Council to the Chairpersons of the International Working Group to the Mediator and to his representative in Côte d'Ivoire encouraging them to promote regular dialogue between the Government and all parties to the conflict in order to find ways and means of dealing with the problem of displaced children, child soldiers and child prostitution.

(d) Letter from the President of the Security Council inviting the African Union Peace and Security Council to devote increasing attention to the conclusion and implementation by all parties to the armed conflict of action plans to halt the recruitment and use of child soldiers.

(e) Letter from the President of the Security Council to the Secretary-General:

(i) Welcoming the intention of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict to visit Côte d'Ivoire;

(ii) Requesting that he provides in his next report to the Security Council on children and armed conflict in Côte d'Ivoire a list, with supporting evidence, of those individuals involved in armed conflict who are suspected of systematically committing grave violations against children, as background documentation, for possible consideration by the Security Council, without prejudging the decisions of the Security Council or the Committee established pursuant to paragraph 14 of resolution 1572 (2004), of future targeted measures in accordance with relevant Security Council resolutions.

4. The Working Group has also agreed to the following direct action:

(a) Letter from the Chairman of the Security Council Working Group to the Secretary-General of the Forces nouvelles:

(i) Urging him to live up to the commitments made in the framework of action plans to halt recruitment and use of child soldiers and to allow for regular in situ verification by the United Nations of their implementation;

(ii) Urging him to rigorously investigate crimes and abuses against children and to refer them in a timely fashion to UNICEF, ONUCI and Ivorian child protection authorities;

(iii) Pending the restoration of the administration of justice system, requesting continued dissemination of the command order of 30 April 2006 instructing an end to the illegal detention of children, while referring in a timely fashion to the relevant United Nations child protection officers alleged cases of serious crimes committed by children.

(b) Letter from the Chairman of the Working Group to the leaders of FLGO, APWé, UPRGO and MILOCI:

(i) Recalling the Security Council's demand for an immediate resumption of the programme for the disarmament and dismantling of militias throughout the national territory, stressing that this programme is a key element of the peace process and underlining their individual responsibility in the full implementation of this process;

(ii) In the meantime, urging them to live up to the commitments made in the framework of action plans to halt recruitment and use of child soldiers and to allow for regular in situ verification by the United Nations of their implementation.

(c) Letter from the Chairman of the Working Group to the World Bank and donors to request timely and adequate capacity and resources for reintegration programmes for demobilized children, with due consideration to the longer-term requirements of such programmes for children.

(d) Letter from the Chairman of the Working Group to the Department of Peacekeeping Operations commending the Department's efforts in the follow-up to Security Council resolution 1612 (2005) and subsequent presidential statements, and requesting:

(i) In close consultation with UNICEF, continued dialogue of ONUCI with the Forces nouvelles, FLGO, APWé, UPRGO and MILOCI for implementation of the existing action plans to halt the recruitment and use of child soldiers;

(ii) Further strengthening of the ONUCI child protection capacity, within its existing mandates.

(e) Letter from the Chairman of the Working Group to UNICEF commending the UNICEF efforts in the follow-up to Security Council resolution 1612 (2005) and subsequent presidential statements, and requesting, in close consultation with ONUCI, continued dialogue with and support to the Forces nouvelles, FLGO, APWé, UPRGO and MILOCI for implementation of the existing action plans to halt the recruitment and use of child soldiers.

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Security Council

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General Assembly
Sixty-first session
Agenda item 13
The situation in the Middle East

Security Council
Sixty-second year

Identical letters dated 15 February 2007 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Lebanon to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

On the instructions of my Government, I transmit to you herewith a statistical summary of Israeli violations between 1 and 8 February 2007 (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would have this letter and its annex circulated as a document of the sixty-first session of the General Assembly, under agenda item 13, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Caroline **Ziadé**
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

07-24147 (E) 200207 200207

Annex to the identical letters dated 15 February 2007 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Lebanon to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

Air violations

On 1 February 2007, between 0827 hours and 1510 hours, an enemy Israeli reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace over the sea off Saida in an easterly direction and circled over the southern regions. It then left Lebanese airspace over Aalma al-Chaab.

On the same date, between 1755 hours and 2001 hours, an enemy Israeli reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace and overflew the town of Deir Kifa at high altitude.

On the same date, between 1835 hours and 1836 hours, an enemy Israeli warplane overflew the town of Al-Khiam, thereby violating Lebanese airspace.

On 5 February 2007, between 1602 hours and 1610 hours, two enemy Israeli warplanes violated Lebanese airspace over Yarun and circled over Bint Jubayl, Rmaich and Yarun. They then left Lebanese airspace.

On 7 February 2006, at 2100 hours, an enemy Israeli reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace over the sea off Naqurah in an easterly direction and circled over the southern regions. It then left Lebanese airspace the next day, 8 February 2007, at 0015 hours, after overflying Aalma al-Chaab.

On the same date, between 2000 hours and 2240 hours, an enemy Israeli helicopter violated Lebanese airspace over Mays al-Jabal, Blida and Rmaich.

Sea violations

None

Land violations

On 4 February 2007, between 2250 hours and 2315 hours, enemy Israeli forces posted at Tarmes and Blida, in occupied Palestinian territory, launched several illumination flares over the Blue Line (opposite the towns of Blida and Aytroun).

On 5 February 2007, between 1030 hours and 1400 hours, 12 military vehicles and 6 civilian vehicles belonging to Israeli enemy forces gathered at the Avivim settlement, in occupied Palestinian territory, near the Blue Line (opposite Marun al-Ra's). Israeli soldiers then launched three smoke bombs, which fell six metres inside Lebanese territory, and subsequently fired a number of rounds of light-weapon fire in the same direction to a distance of about 40 metres inside Lebanese territory. About 30 enemy Israeli forces personnel then took up positions in combat order opposite Lebanese territory and a Merkava tank was posted near the border strip. Some 20 soldiers then conducted a detailed search of the area. Journalists were seen accompanying the detachment of Israeli soldiers. The Israeli soldiers and vehicles eventually left the area at 1800 hours.

On 7 February 2007, between 2000 hours and 2240 hours, enemy Israeli forces posted inside the occupied territories launched illumination flares near the towns of Mays al-Jabal, Blida and Rmaich.

On the same date, at 2240 hours, an earth-moving machine and an excavator belonging to the Israeli enemy, having come from the post at Saleha, crossed the Blue Line at Marun al-Ra's. A Lebanese army detachment then opened fire with light and medium weapons in the direction of the two vehicles, one of which ceased operation while the other continued. At 2315 hours, enemy Israeli forces opened fire on a crawler belonging to the eleventh Lebanese mechanized brigade, which was immobilized. The firing caused no injuries. The two Israeli vehicles departed in the direction of the occupied territories at 2345 hours.

Israeli activities

On 7 February 2007, between 1150 hours and 1515 hours, enemy Israeli forces fortified the post at Saleha, situated opposite Marun al-Ra's, by posting two Merkava tanks and two crawlers there. Two military vehicles were also seen operating between the post at El-Hadb, opposite the town of Yarun, and the post at Saleha.

On the same date, between 1830 hours and 2145 hours, enemy Israeli military vehicles were seen operating inside occupied Palestinian territory opposite Yarun, near the French forces' post (opposite Rmaich), at Saleha (opposite Marun al-Ra's), at Bayadh (opposite Blida), at Barkat Richa (opposite Al-Boustane) and at Zarite (opposite Marouahine).

On the same date, between 1940 hours and 1950 hours, an Israeli military launch, lying at anchor off Ra's Naqurah, fired several rounds of medium-weapon fire within Palestinian territorial waters.

On the same date, between 2000 hours and 2240 hours, warplanes and helicopters overflew occupied Palestinian territory.

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Letter dated 15 February 2007 from the Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to refer to Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) of 28 April 2004, concerning the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. By paragraph 4 of the resolution, the Council established a Committee that would report to it on Member States' implementation of the resolution. In reporting to the Council, the Committee would, as appropriate, also call on other expertise.

On 5 February 2007, the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004) approved the recruitment of three experts to fill current vacancies in the current group of experts assisting the Committee in its work. Accordingly, I wish to inform you that I have appointed the following experts to facilitate the work of that Committee:

Olivia Bosch (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland)
Isabella Interlandi (Italy)
V. Siddhartha (India)

I should be grateful if you could bring this matter to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) **Ban** Ki-moon

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Security Council

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20 February 2007

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Congo, Ghana, Panama, Slovakia, South Africa, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and United States of America: draft resolution

The Security Council,

Recalling its previous resolutions concerning the situation in Somalia, in particular resolution 733 (1992), resolution 1356 (2001), resolution 1425 (2002) and resolution 1725 (2006), the statements of its President, in particular those of 13 July 2006 (S/PRST/2006/31) and 22 December 2006 (S/PRST/2006/59),

Reaffirming its respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity, political independence and unity of Somalia,

Reiterating its commitment to a comprehensive and lasting settlement of the situation in Somalia through the Transitional Federal Charter, and stressing the importance of broad-based and representative institutions reached through an all-inclusive political process, as envisaged in the Transitional Federal Charter,

Reiterating its strong support for the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Mr. François Fall,

Reiterating its appreciation of the efforts of the African Union, the League of Arab States and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development to promote peace, stability and reconciliation in Somalia, and *welcoming* their continued engagement in this regard,

Taking note of the communiqué of the African Union Peace and Security Council of 19 January 2007, which states that the African Union shall deploy for a period of six months a mission to Somalia (AMISOM), aimed essentially at contributing to the initial stabilization phase in Somalia, and that the mission will evolve into a United Nations operation that will support the long-term stabilization and post-conflict restoration of Somalia,

Welcoming the African Union's intention to establish a mission in Somalia and *underlining* the urgency of the development,

Welcoming the decision of Ethiopia to withdraw its troops from Somalia, *taking note* of the fact that Ethiopia has already started withdrawing its troops, and *underlining* that the deployment of AMISOM will help avoid a security vacuum and create the conditions for full withdrawal and the lifting of emergency security measures currently in place,

07-24525 (E) 200207

Reiterating its support for Somalia's Transitional Federal Institutions, *underlining* the importance of maintaining and providing stability and security throughout Somalia, and *underscoring* in this regard the importance of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of militia and ex-combatants in Somalia,

Condemning all acts of violence and extremism inside Somalia, *deploring* the recent bombings in Mogadishu, and *expressing* its concern regarding the continued violence inside Somalia,

Determining that the situation in Somalia continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security in the region,

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

1. *Stresses* the need for broad-based and representative institutions reached through an all-inclusive political process in Somalia, as envisaged in the Transitional Federal Charter, in order to consolidate stability, peace and reconciliation in the country and ensure that international assistance is as effective as possible;

2. *Welcomes* the initiative of the Transitional Federal Institutions to pursue an inclusive intra-Somali political process, particularly the announcement made by President Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed at the African Union Summit of his intention to convene urgently a national reconciliation congress involving all stakeholders including political leaders, clan leaders, religious leaders, and representatives of civil society, *looks forward* to the sustained and all-inclusive political process that is needed as a result of that commitment and that will help pave the way to democratic elections at the local, regional and national levels as set out in Somalia's Transitional Federal Charter, and *encourages* those in the Transitional Federal Government and the other Transitional Federal Institutions to unite behind efforts to promote such an inclusive dialogue;

3. *Requests* the Secretary-General to assist the Transitional Federal Institutions with the national reconciliation congress, and, more widely, promoting an ongoing all-inclusive political process, working together with the African Union, the League of Arab States and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development, *requests* the Secretary-General to report back to the Security Council within sixty (60) days of adoption of this resolution on progress made by the Transitional Federal Institutions in pursuing an all-inclusive political process and reconciliation, and *reiterates its intention* to consider taking measures against those who seek to prevent or block a peaceful political process, threaten the Transitional Federal Institutions by force, or take action that undermines stability in Somalia or the region;

4. *Decides* to authorize member States of the African Union to establish for a period of six months a mission in Somalia, which shall be authorized to take all necessary measures as appropriate to carry out the following mandate:

(a) To support dialogue and reconciliation in Somalia by assisting with the free movement, safe passage and protection of all those involved with the process referred to in paragraphs 1, 2 and 3;

(b) To provide, as appropriate, protection to the Transitional Federal Institutions to help them carry out their functions of government, and security for key infrastructure;

(c) To assist, within its capabilities, and in coordination with other parties, with implementation of the National Security and Stabilization Plan, in particular the effective re-establishment and training of all-inclusive Somali security forces;

(d) To contribute, as may be requested and within capabilities, to the creation of the necessary security conditions for the provision of humanitarian assistance;

(e) To protect its personnel, facilities, installations, equipment and mission, and to ensure the security and freedom of movement of its personnel;

5. *Urges* member States of the African Union to contribute to the above mission in order to create the conditions for the withdrawal of all other foreign forces from Somalia;

6. *Decides* that the measures imposed by paragraph 5 of resolution 733 (1992) and further elaborated in paragraphs 1 and 2 of resolution 1425 (2002) shall not apply to:

(a) Supplies of weapons and military equipment, technical training and assistance intended solely for the support of or use by the mission referred to in paragraph 4 above; or

(b) Such supplies and technical assistance by States intended solely for the purpose of helping develop security sector institutions, consistent with the political process set out in paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 above and in the absence of a negative decision by the Committee established pursuant to resolution 751 (1992) within five working days of receiving the notification described in paragraph 7 below;

7. *Decides* that States providing supplies or technical assistance in accordance with paragraph 7 (b) above shall notify the Committee established pursuant to resolution 751 (1992) in advance and on a case-by-case basis;

8. *Urges* Member States to provide personnel, equipment and services if required, for the successful deployment of AMISOM, and *encourages* Member States to provide financial resources for AMISOM;

9. *Requests* the Secretary-General to send a Technical Assessment Mission to the African Union headquarters and Somalia as soon as possible to report on the political and security situation and the possibility of a UN Peacekeeping Operation following the AU's deployment, and to report to the Security Council within sixty (60) days of the adoption of this resolution with recommendations covering the UN's further engagement in support of peace and security in Somalia, as well as further recommendations on stabilization and reconstruction;

10. *Emphasizes* the continued contribution made to Somalia's peace and security by the arms embargo, *demands* that all Member States, in particular those of the region, fully comply with it, and *reiterates* its intention to consider urgently ways to strengthen its effectiveness, including through targeted measures in support of the arms embargo;

11. *Expresses its deep concern* over the humanitarian situation in Somalia, *demands* that all parties in Somalia ensure complete and unhindered humanitarian access, as well as providing guarantees for the safety and security of humanitarian aid workers in Somalia, and *welcomes* and *encourages* the ongoing relief efforts in Somalia;

12. *Decides* that, having regard to the establishment of AMISOM, the measures contained in paragraphs 3 to 7 of resolution 1725 (2006) shall no longer apply;

13. *Decides* to remain actively seized of the matter.

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Security Council

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Report of the Secretary-General on Chad and the Central African Republic

I. Introduction

1. In his report on Chad and the Central African Republic dated 22 December 2006 (S/2006/1019), submitted pursuant to paragraphs 9 (d) and 13 of Security Council resolution 1706 (2006), my predecessor provided an overview of the political, security, humanitarian and human rights situations in both countries and the challenges related to the protection of refugees, internally displaced persons and other civilians in areas near the border with the Sudan. The report also outlined some preliminary options regarding the possible mandate, structure and concept of operations of a multidimensional United Nations presence in both eastern Chad and north-eastern Central African Republic, which would seek to improve the security situation in the areas along the borders between those two countries and the Sudan.

2. The Security Council considered the report during informal consultations held on 10 January 2007. Subsequently, following a meeting held on 16 January 2007, the President of the Security Council issued a statement (S/PRST/2007/2) that took note of the report of 22 December 2006 and authorized the immediate return of the technical assessment mission to the region, in order to finalize recommendations on the size, structure and mandate of a United Nations multidimensional presence.

3. The 2007 presidential statement also requested that I deploy as soon as possible an advance mission to Chad and the Central African Republic, in consultation with their Governments, as envisaged in paragraph 88 of the 22 December 2006 report, in order to accelerate preparations for an early decision on the possible deployment of a multidimensional presence in those countries.

4. The present report reflects the findings of the second multidimensional technical assessment mission, which visited Chad and the Central African Republic from 21 January to 6 February 2007. It also includes a description of the advance mission and detailed proposals for the size, structure and mandate of a United Nations multidimensional presence in the two countries.

07-24207 (E) 220207

II. Update on recent developments

A. Chad

5. Since my predecessor's report of 22 December 2006 was finalized, the situation in Chad has remained volatile and unpredictable. Fighting between the Chadian National Army (ANT) and rebel groups, some of which are reportedly armed and supported by the Sudan, and attacks by militia on the civilian population have continued to destabilize eastern Chad, leading to widespread insecurity and human rights violations, including continued internal displacement of civilian populations. To address the situation, the Government of Chad has maintained a state of emergency in Wadi Fira, Ouaddai and Salamat, the three regions in eastern Chad that border the Sudan and the Central African Republic, as well as in N'Djamena.

6. In a positive development, on 24 December 2006, the Government and one faction of the rebel group Front Uni pour le Changement (FUC) signed an agreement in Tripoli that, among other things, called for armed elements of FUC to be integrated into ANT and the Chadian gendarmerie. Despite some difficulties in implementing the agreement, FUC is reportedly being gradually integrated into ANT and the Chadian gendarmerie. However, the agreement was disparaged by other rebel groups, including the Union of Forces for Democracy and Development (UFDD), the Rally of Democratic Forces (RFD) and the Platform for Change, National Unity and Democracy, which questioned the military strength of FUC and decided, one day after the agreement was signed, to coordinate their military efforts against the Government.

7. Rebel activity continued throughout December 2006 and January 2007. On 13 January 2007, UFDD attacked and briefly occupied the town of Ounianga Kebir, located in the northern department of Tibesti, more than 350 kilometres west of the border with the Sudan. Then on 17 January 2007, UFDD and RFD combined forces to take the border town of Adé, following the relocation of an ANT garrison from Adé to Goz Beida. ANT regained control of the town on 24 January, following an aerial attack on rebel positions.

8. In continuation of this pattern, on 1 February 2007 UFDD struck again, attacking the eastern town of Adré, which is located on the border with the Sudan, 30 kilometres west of El Geneina, the capital of West Darfur. Violent fighting ensued in the following days, with ANT maintaining control of the town and pushing the rebels back into the Sudan. Details of the attack were communicated to the Secretary-General in a note verbale dated 1 February 2007 from the Permanent Mission of Chad to the United Nations. Despite these flare-ups, it can be said that the security situation in eastern Chad improved significantly in the second half of January. That was due in part to the successful counteroffensive, which enabled Chadian Government forces to push the rebels back to the immediate border area or, beyond, into Darfur.

9. While violence associated with rebel activities continues, it should be noted that civilians have generally not been targeted by the rebels. Militia attacks, on the other hand, have targeted civilians. Throughout late December and early January, militia groups attacked Chadian villages in the Dar Sila area of the Ouaddai region. In one particularly brutal assault, militia groups attacked Chadian civilians near the

town of Koukou Angarana on 15 and 16 December 2006, killing 30, including local residents, internally displaced persons and a few Sudanese refugees who had wandered outside their camps. That was followed on 16 December by heavy fighting between ANT and militia groups around the town of Habilé, which is in the same area, forcing 9,000 internally displaced people who had sought refuge around Habilé to move towards Koukou Angarana; that was the second time they had been forced to flee for their lives.

10. As a direct result of the ongoing violence and the attacks by militias on Chadian populations, the number of internally displaced persons in eastern Chad had risen from an estimated 92,000 in December 2006 to approximately 120,000 by 1 February 2007. Most of this new displacement occurred in the Dar Sila area. Meanwhile, the refugee population for all of eastern Chad has stabilized at around 232,000, of whom 220,000 are hosted in 12 camps supported by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), with the remainder living with local communities.

11. The increase in internally displaced persons (IDPs) has exacerbated the humanitarian crisis in eastern Chad. Newly displaced persons consistently settle on the periphery of refugee camps and existing towns or villages. Since direct assistance to internally displaced persons has thus far been insufficient, they are relying to some extent on refugees and local populations to share their meagre resources. This often leads to tension when those resources are particularly scarce or valuable, as is the case with firewood, fodder and water. In addition, thousands of items of unexploded ordnance are scattered in the vicinity of several localities, preventing access to those scarce resources. The decision of the Government to allocate $8 million to assist internally displaced persons is a constructive step, which should be complemented by additional international assistance.

12. The response to increased humanitarian needs in eastern Chad is also hampered by the security situation. In view of the continuing instability, relief organizations are required to take precautions, including limiting the number of staff operating in the region, and in some locations permitting them to move only with armed escort, thus making it difficult to ensure the safe provision of much needed assistance. However, contingency planning, including reliance on Chadian staff and the refugees themselves, has thus far prevented any major disruptions in essential services, notably the provision of food aid, health care and sanitation in refugee camps. The security situation has, however, hampered the provision of assistance to the IDPs.

B. Central African Republic

13. In the Central African Republic, there has been noteworthy progress on the political front since my predecessor's report dated 22 December 2006. The President of the Central African Republic agreed to engage in an inclusive dialogue with opposition parties and representatives of the armed rebellion. A Central African civil society group, the Group of the Wise, comprising representatives of all the religions present in the country, the leader of the follow-up committee on the implementation of the results of the 2003 national dialogue and the leader of the national human rights associations, is leading the current dialogue process. The Group is being

assisted by the United Nations Peacebuilding Support Office in the Central African Republic (BONUCA).

14. On 28 January 2007, President Francois Bozizé met with the representatives of various rebel groups operating in the Central African Republic in Syrte, Libya, and, on 2 February 2007, the Government of the Central African Republic and those rebel groups signed a peace agreement that provided, inter alia, for the immediate cessation of hostilities. The next step in the dialogue process will be the holding of further consultations and developing agreements for national reconciliation. The conclusive phase of the dialogue is scheduled to be held in the coming months, when it is expected that a comprehensive accord will be signed among all the national stakeholders.

15. Meanwhile, civilian populations have started to return to the towns in the north-east part of the country, which had been occupied by rebels and subsequently recaptured by the forces of the Central African Armed Forces (FACA), supported by the subregional multinational force (FOMUC) of the Central African Economic and Monetary Community (CEMAC), and the French forces in the Central African Republic.

16. The re-establishment of Government presence in Birao has also allowed humanitarian actors to initiate assessments in the prefecture of Vakaga. Their findings confirmed that some towns and villages have suffered significant destruction and segments of the population may remain internally displaced and fear renewed attacks, as well as reprisals on the part of the national army for their alleged support to the rebellion.

17. While the focus of the technical assessment mission was on north-eastern Central African Republic, the security situation in the north-western part of the country remains volatile. On 15 January 2007, a group of rebels reportedly attacked the town of Paoua in the north-west part of the country, causing casualties and injuries. In this context, and as indicated in the report dated 22 December 2006, the humanitarian situation in north-west Central African Republic is a matter of serious concern, as more than 70,000 internally displaced persons are living under threat of indiscriminate violence.

III. Technical assessment mission

A. Programme of work

18. The second technical assessment mission to Chad and the Central African Republic was led by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and included staff from the Department of Political Affairs, the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), UNHCR, the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, and the United Nations Department of Safety and Security.

19. The assessment mission arrived in Chad on 21 January 2006, for two days of consultations with Chadian officials, including the Minister for Foreign Affairs, the Chief of Military Staff and the inter-ministerial committee charged with coordinating contact with the assessment mission, and with the United Nations country team, the diplomatic community, humanitarian organizations and other stakeholders.

20. On 23 January 2007, the assessment mission, accompanied by liaison officers from ANT, the gendarmerie and the police, travelled to Abéché in eastern Chad, where it undertook consultations with local authorities, representatives of the United Nations country team and humanitarian organizations.

21. From 24 to 28 January, the assessment mission visited the towns of Adré, Bahai, Biltine, Farchana, Goz Beïda, Iriba, Koukou Angarana and Tine. It also visited the refugee camps and internally displaced persons settlements close to those locations, including Farchana, Gaga, Goz Amer, Iridimi and Oure Cassoni. The team received direct operational support throughout its visit to Chad from UNHCR and vital helicopter transportation from the French military stationed in Abéché.

22. On 30 January the assessment mission travelled to Bangui for consultations with Government officials and representatives from the armed forces, police and gendarmerie; briefings with BONUCA and the United Nations country team; and a meeting with the diplomatic community.

23. From 31 January to 1 February, members of the assessment mission travelled to the prefecture of Vakaga of the Central African Republic, for a first-hand assessment of the situation in the town of Birao and the surrounding area. That group subsequently travelled to Am Dafok on the border with the Sudan for additional fact-finding.

24. The assessment mission returned to N'Djamena from 2 to 6 February, where it was joined by Hédi Annabi, Assistant Secretary-General for peacekeeping operations, who met with President Déby on 5 February 2007, and with other senior Government officials, as well as the United Nations country team and members of the diplomatic community in N'Djamena. The assessment team also shared its findings and preliminary conclusions with the inter-ministerial committee on 5 February.

B. Key findings: Chad

25. During the visit of the assessment mission to eastern Chad, local Chadian authorities and affected populations, as well as many humanitarian organizations expressed broad support for the early deployment of a multidimensional United Nations presence that would focus on the protection of civilians in the area and defusing border tensions. Chadian authorities, including the Minister for Foreign Affairs, and the members of the diplomatic community in Chad were also of the view that a United Nations deployment should not be made directly contingent upon the establishment of an inclusive dialogue in Chad.

26. The assessment mission also contacted representatives of some rebel groups to inform them of the possible deployment of a multidimensional United Nations presence near the border with the Sudan. In response, rebel interlocutors stressed that they would not object to the presence of an impartial United Nations operation. However, if they perceived that the United Nations was actively working in support of Government military operations, they would view the United Nations force as a belligerent.

27. In assessing the security situation in eastern Chad, it is evident that activities of armed rebel movements seeking to overthrow the Government continue to destabilize the area. This is most clearly illustrated by the situation in Adré, which

was attacked by rebel groups on 1 February 2007. ANT is focused on addressing the rebel threat, which is affecting its ability to provide protection to the civilian population and ensure maintenance of law and order throughout the eastern part of the country.

28. During discussions with representatives of internally displaced persons and refugees it was also made clear that militia groups based in the Sudan and characterized as "Janjaweed", who cross into Chad to attack civilians, were seen as the foremost threat to their safety. Chadian civilians seemed to be the most frequent target of those attacks, which resulted in the partial destruction of the internally displaced persons site at Habilé, in the Salamat prefecture.

29. The mission also identified or confirmed other threats to civilian populations, in addition to incursions from the Sudan. The first of these was intercommunal tension and violence, particularly in the Dar Sila department of the Ouaddai region, where compelling evidence, including confidential testimony, indicated that local populations and internally displaced persons had been attacked, displaced and killed by militia largely composed of Chadian elements.

30. In addition, the assessment mission received numerous credible reports that Sudanese rebel groups were operating and openly recruiting in and around Oure Cassoni and Am Nabak camps near the border with the Sudan in the Wadi Fira region, as well as in other refugee camps, and that there were children among those being recruited. Although the Government and UNHCR agreed that these camps, which are very close to the border, should be moved deeper into the Chadian territory to ensure that their civilian and humanitarian character are preserved, no alternative suitable sites have been identified.

31. In the meantime, the security aspects of the crisis remain the focus of Chadian authorities. The Government has made clear that it will not engage rebel groups in dialogue until they hand over their weapons. As a result, there is as yet no substantial political or reconciliation process in place to formally identify and address grievances of Chadian rebel groups or to discuss the causes of intercommunal violence, which poses a serious threat to the safety and security of Chadian civilians. In addition, it seems that traditional conflict resolution mechanisms have been overwhelmed by the intensity and frequency of the violence of the last two years, although subsequent to the signing of the agreement between FUC and the Government on 24 December, a reconciliation agreement was signed between the Dedjo and Arab groups in south-eastern Chad, to address the requirements for self-defence, in response to repeated attacks of "Janjaweed" militia.

32. During the course of its visit, the assessment mission also had first-hand experience of the logistical challenges related to deploying a multidimensional mission to eastern Chad. This vast territory of approximately 165,000 square kilometres is criss-crossed by wadis (riverbeds) that, while dry for much of the year, can flood in minutes during the rainy season (May-October). Most roads are sand or dirt tracks that become impassable during this period, cutting off large sections of territory for long periods. In addition, there is only one airstrip in the region capable of servicing large aircraft, and little or no communications infrastructure in place.

33. At the conclusion of the assessment mission, President Déby received Mr. Annabi on 5 February in Am Timam in eastern Chad. The President recalled that

he had previously given his agreement in principle to the deployment of a United Nations multidimensional presence. However, he expressed concerns about the military component of the proposed mission. He stressed that Chad had asked the Security Council in November 2006 to deploy a "civilian force" to the camps in eastern Chad. The President emphasized that the Government of Chad had not requested the deployment of a military force. Furthermore, he expressed the view that the international community was considering the deployment of a United Nations military force in Chad because the Sudan had refused to accept the deployment of a United Nations operation in Darfur. President Déby stressed that he wished to see additional details about the proposed operation, in writing, before taking a final decision. Accordingly, in addition to briefing extensively and in detail the Chadian inter-ministerial committee on its findings at the end of the mission, the technical assessment mission handed over, on 6 February, to General N'Gomine, military coordinator of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Chair of the inter-ministerial committee, an aide-memoire describing its proposed recommendations on the mandate, size and structure of a United Nations multidimensional operation in eastern Chad. The technical assessment mission pointed out that those recommendations were subject to the approval of the Secretary-General and ultimately the Security Council.

C. Key findings: Central African Republic

34. Much of the civilian population that had fled Birao during the hostilities of late November 2006 had returned, and the situation in Birao, as well as Am Dafok on the border with the Sudan, appeared to have stabilized owing to the presence of the FACA troops, the gendarmerie and the police in both towns, along with the presence of a small French detachment in Birao. However, there are still pockets of insecurity in the Vakaga prefecture, in the area of Gordil and Tiringoulou, and north of Bria. Some sources estimate the number of internally displaced persons in the region (mainly of the Goula ethnic group) at around 10,000. Remnants of the rebel groups are still reportedly present in those areas.

35. In addition, there are still a number of other factors contributing to insecurity, including criminal elements and poachers who take advantage of the lawlessness in the area and porous borders with the Sudan. The assessment mission was also made aware of allegations of human rights violations and violence targeting civilian populations, including by FACA in reprisal for those communities, which are perceived as supporting the rebels.

36. Civilians in the Vakaga prefecture are making every effort to return to a normal life. While there is no evidence of a humanitarian emergency at present, isolation, economic marginalization and recent insecurity have created serious relief and recovery needs that, for the time being, the central Government seems unable to address.

37. The team noted that the decision of the Government of the Central African Republic to close its border with the Sudan is having a negative impact on the traditional trade routes from the Sudan into the Vakaga prefecture. Local populations are almost entirely dependent on the free flow of goods and services across that border.

38. During its brief visit, the assessment mission did not see compelling evidence that the situation in the Vakaga prefecture is directly related to the crisis in Darfur. However, mindful of the events of October to December 2006, when a number of towns in the Vakaga prefecture were occupied by rebel groups that had allegedly received external support, the assessment mission took note of the Government's view that the two situations are linked. It also noted the Government's call for the United Nations deployment to address the possible impact of the Darfur crisis on the Central African Republic.

IV. Advance mission

A. Background

39. In consideration of the above, and pursuant to the presidential statement issued by the Security Council on 16 January 2007 (S/PRST/2007/2), I have initiated the necessary steps to deploy an advance mission to Chad and the Central African Republic. The advance mission, which would be known as the United Nations Mission in Chad and the Central African Republic, or Mission des Nations Unies au Tchad et en République Centrafricaine (MINUTAC), would prepare for the possible multidimensional presence foreshadowed in the presidential statement of 16 January 2007.

40. Throughout the technical assessment mission the broad parameters of the advance mission were discussed with local authorities and other stakeholders. In the light of those discussions and based on the guidance provided by the Security Council, preparations for its establishment are currently under way as follows.

B. Mandate

41. In accordance with the presidential statement of 16 January 2007, the mandate of the Mission has been derived from paragraph 88 of the report of the Secretary-General of 22 December 2006 on Chad and the Central African Republic. The Mission's activities would therefore focus on those preparations, which would position the multidimensional presence to protect civilians and assist in mitigating the spill-over of the Darfur conflict. This would require collecting information on the situation in eastern Chad in order to develop a full understanding of the security and protection challenges that a United Nations multidimensional presence would face.

42. Should the Security Council authorize a multidimensional United Nations presence in Chad and the Central African Republic, it is anticipated that the Mission would be merged into that operation.

C. Tasks

43. To accomplish the above, the Mission would have to establish effective liaison with all key stakeholders (including the Governments, the national military, police and gendarmerie, all credible opposition groups, French forces, the humanitarian community, civil society, the African Union Mission in the Sudan (AMIS), the

United Nations Mission in the Sudan (UNMIS) and FOMUC) to initiate preparatory activities, including further detailed planning and logistical measures in anticipation of the deployment of a multidimensional United Nations operation, support the establishment of a framework for constructive dialogue between the Governments concerned in the region and between the Government and opposition groups, liaise with the United Nations country teams in both Chad and the Central African Republic, and BONUCA in the Central African Republic to ensure complementarities, liaise with the broader humanitarian community in the two countries, and develop mechanisms that will contribute to improving the security environment and protecting civilians with a view to contributing to a reduction of violence in the region.

D. Composition

44. The Mission would be led by a Head of Mission, who would be the Representative of the Secretary-General for Chad and would be responsible for implementing the peacekeeping mandate in north-eastern Central African Republic. The Mission would be comprised of political, civil affairs, legal, military, police, judicial, corrections, humanitarian, human rights, mine action, public information, conduct and discipline, safety and security, administrative and mission support personnel who would implement the mandate of the Mission under the overall supervision of the Head of Mission.

E. Location

45. The Mission headquarters would be located in N'Djamena, where the Head of Mission would be based. A regional office in Abéché and a liaison office in Bangui would also be established. At a later stage, security conditions permitting, the Mission would also establish multidisciplinary field offices in Iriba, Adré and Goz Beida in eastern Chad and Birao in north-eastern Central African Republic.

F. Size

46. In addition to the Head of Mission, the Mission would include military, police and civilian personnel. A total of 35 military officers would establish liaison relationships with ANT, FACA and other stakeholders in N'Djamena and Bangui and in the vicinity of the five identified field offices, and would collect information in order to inform and finalize detailed plans for the envisaged multidimensional presence. In addition, 39 United Nations police officers would finalize specific aspects of a detailed strategy to address policing requirements of refugee camps, key towns where humanitarian field offices are located, humanitarian commuting routes and areas of IDP concentrations, assist in the process of identifying Chadian police and gendarmes for secondment, training and eventual deployment to the envisaged peacekeeping operation, prepare agreements with the Government of Chad regarding division of responsibilities between United Nations police and Chadian law enforcement officials, and initiate preparations for the training and deployment of United Nations police to eastern Chad. The activities of United Nations military and police personnel would be complemented by the work of an appropriate number

of substantive civilian staff in the areas of political affairs, human rights, the rule of law, humanitarian liaison, public information, mine action and safety and security. The Mission would also include the necessary mission support personnel, who would be responsible for all aspects of logistical and administrative preparation for the possible establishment of a multidimensional operation.

V. Proposed United Nations multidimensional presence in Chad and the Central African Republic

A. Mandate

47. Should the Security Council decide to establish a multidimensional United Nations presence in eastern Chad and the north-eastern part of the Central African Republic, I would recommend that it be entrusted with the following main tasks, which take into account the continuing instability along the borders between the Sudan, Chad and the Central African Republic and the threat that this poses to the safety of the civilian population and the conduct of humanitarian operations:

Security and protection of civilians

- Assist in protecting civilians at risk, including internally displaced persons and refugees, within the capabilities of the United Nations operation and in its areas of deployment.
- Assist with the maintenance of law and order in the refugee camps, key towns where humanitarian field offices are located, humanitarian commuting routes, internally displaced persons sites and host communities.
- Deploy at key locations in the border area, with a view to reducing tension and facilitating confidence-building.
- Liaise with the national army, the gendarmerie, the police force, judicial authorities, and prison officials in Chad and the Central African Republic to contribute to the creation of a more secure environment in eastern Chad and north-eastern Central African Republic.
- Facilitate the provision and the free movement of humanitarian assistance.
- Liaise with the Government of Chad and UNHCR in support of their efforts to relocate refugee camps in close proximity to the border, including with regard to the provision of logistical support for the relocation of such camps.
- Take all necessary measures to protect United Nations personnel, facilities, installations and equipment and ensure the security and freedom of movement of its personnel.
- Liaise closely with the African Union, AMIS, UNMIS and the Government of the Sudan to exchange information on emerging threats in the border region.

Good offices

- Facilitate improvement of relations between Chad and the Sudan and between the Central African Republic and the Sudan, particularly with regard to the implementation of the Tripoli and N'Djamena Agreements.

- Support, as necessary, the efforts of the Government of Chad to establish a sustained political dialogue with unarmed opposition groups and coordinate with BONUCA regarding its support to similar efforts by the Government of the Central African Republic.
- Assist, as necessary, in developing an appropriate framework for the cessation of hostilities, and reconciliation between the Governments and armed opposition groups.

Human rights

- Contribute to the promotion and protection of human rights by monitoring, documenting and reporting on violations in eastern Chad and north-eastern Central African Republic.
- Conduct preliminary investigations in cases of major human rights violations in eastern Chad and north-eastern Central African Republic, with particular attention to sexual and gender-based violence, and to recommend corrective action to relevant actors.
- Support, within its capabilities, efforts aimed at strengthening capacity of local authorities and civil society through training in international human rights standards.

B. Area of operations

48. The area of operations of the Mission would be eastern Chad, specifically, the Wadi Fira, Ouaddai and Salamat regions and the Ennedi Est department; and north-eastern Central African Republic, including the Vakaga prefecture and areas of Haute-Kotto prefecture that border the Sudan.

C. Mission structure

49. The United Nations presence in Chad and the Central African Republic would be a multidimensional operation composed of several components, led by a Head of Mission, who would be my Special Representative for Chad, and would be responsible for implementing the peacekeeping mandate in north-eastern Central African Republic. In this regard, my Special Representative would have overall authority over the activities of the United Nations, providing overall management and policy guidance and ensuring that all United Nations activities pursue a coordinated and coherent approach in the Mission's area of operation, in accordance with established United Nations policy.

50. The senior leadership of the Mission, which would be based at the Mission headquarters in N'Djamena, would also include a Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General, a Chief of Staff, a Force Commander at the rank of Major General, a Police Commissioner and a Director of Administration. This senior management team would report directly to my Special Representative. In order to ensure effective liaison between the Mission and the aid community on matters pertaining to humanitarian affairs, the United Nations resident/humanitarian coordinator for Chad would be a member of the Mission's senior management team, while retaining his/her relevant reporting lines to the Emergency Relief Coordinator

and the United Nations Development Programme Administrator. The Mission headquarters would also include representatives of all substantive components, as well as the necessary safety and security and mission support personnel.

51. A joint mission analysis cell would be established under the direction of the Head of Mission at its headquarters in N'Djamena to collect and analyse information and ensure that the views and expertise of all relevant components of the Mission are reflected in informing his or her decisions. To that end, the cell would be staffed with military, police, political affairs, safety and security, humanitarian and human rights personnel and other components, as required. The mission-wide analysis work of the cell would be complemented by a joint operations centre, which would be established in the regional office in Abéché and would be staffed with the same cross-section of Mission personnel as the cell. The joint operations centre would focus on providing real-time information and situational awareness to the Head of Mission and senior management.

52. The majority of the Mission personnel would be based in eastern Chad. The Mission would therefore establish a regional office in Abéché, which would also serve as the forward headquarters for the military and police component of the Mission. Conduct of the day-to-day functions of the regional office would be managed by a Deputy Special Representative, who would be supported by a regional management team comprised of a Senior Political Affairs Officer, a Deputy Force Commander, a Deputy Police Commissioner and a Deputy Chief of Administration, as well as civil affairs, human rights, humanitarian liaison, public information, mission support and safety and security personnel.

53. To cover the large territory of eastern Chad effectively, it would be essential for the Mission to be forward leaning, and to establish multidimensional field offices in the following key locations: Iriba, Adré and Goz Beida and, possibly, a liaison office in Biltine. Smaller liaison offices could also be established in Bahai and Nzili. These offices would report to my Special Representative through his Deputy in Abéché.

54. With regard to the Central African Republic, the Mission would establish a liaison office in Bangui, which would be co-located and work closely with BONUCA. It would be managed by a senior political affairs officer and a civilian liaison officer, and would include one military officer, one police officer, one human rights officer and one humanitarian affairs liaison officer, as well as a small mission support component. Liaison with senior levels of the Government of the Central African Republic in Bangui would continue to be led by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for the Central African Republic.

55. In north-eastern Central African Republic, the Mission would establish a multidimensional presence in the town of Birao, to include a small civil affairs, military and police presence, as well as human rights, humanitarian liaison and mission support personnel.

56. The Mission would be deployed in phases, with the first priority being the establishment of a viable regional office and forward headquarters in Abéché, to be followed by the establishment of field offices in eastern Chad and, finally, the establishment of the liaison and field office in the Central African Republic.

D. Component activities

Good offices and civil affairs

57. The Mission would include good offices and civil affairs components. The good offices component would provide support and advice to my Special Representative in the performance of his/her tasks, as described in paragraph 49 above. To this end, the good offices component would consult regularly with key national and regional stakeholders and would monitor and provide analysis on major political and administrative developments. The component would also be responsible for reporting to United Nations headquarters. The civil affairs component would liaise with the local authorities and civil society in the areas of deployment to ensure a constructive relationship between these stakeholders and the Mission, including through exchange of information. Civil affairs officers would also promote and support local reconciliation initiatives. Both the good offices and civil affairs components would have staff in N'Djamena and in field locations in eastern Chad and north-eastern Central African Republic, as well as in the liaison office in Bangui.

Military component

58. The military component would assist in protecting civilians at risk, facilitate delivery of humanitarian relief, and seek through its presence to reduce tension and deter conflict, with a view to establishing a more secure environment in its area of deployment.

59. Liaison with all relevant stakeholders, especially the armed forces of Chad and the Central African Republic and any other armed elements present in the area, would be critical to ensure an understanding of, and respect for, the impartial character of the United Nations force. Close liaison with AMIS and UNMIS should also be established for the exchange of information on potential threats developing on either side of the border, in order to provide early warning.

60. A framework of infantry battalions would be deployed to provide an effective presence through ground and air patrols, day and night, in order to reassure and discourage attacks against the civilian population. The provision of wide area security would also expand the zone in which humanitarian actors could safely operate. Night patrolling would be particularly important and the battalions with supporting aviation should be capable of and equipped for night operations. To achieve an early effect on the ground, the rapid deployment of a minimum of two infantry battalions with engineer and medical support would be required.

61. In order to identify emerging threats, the force should possess surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities such as observation aircraft, armed helicopters and unmanned aerial vehicles, as well as ground reconnaissance elements capable of long-range patrols. In order to react effectively to impeding threats to the civilian population, the military force must be capable and ready to act. The force should be authorized to take robust action, supported by appropriate rules of engagement, and be equipped to respond robustly to any hostile action. Armed helicopters would provide an effective and rapid response, as well as quick reaction forces at force and sector levels, deployed in armoured personnel carriers, high mobility vehicles and military aviation.

62. To reduce tensions in the border area and deter conflict, United Nations military forces would patrol and observe potential flashpoints in the area of operations. This would not interfere with the sovereign responsibility of the Chadian and Central African Republic authorities to secure their border with the Sudan. The United Nations military forces could also investigate and verify allegations of hostile actions in the Chad-Sudan border region, and could subsequently provide the Security Council with an assessment of such incidents.

63. In the Central African Republic, a small security presence would be needed to assist in confidence-building and deter conflict. Such a presence could be provided by a United Nations deployment of approximately 500 personnel.

64. Military engineers would be critical in each sector, initially to construct "bare-base" camps and then to improve the force's mobility by constructing helicopter landing grounds and improving tracks. The force would also require medical and logistic enabling capabilities.

65. In summary, the assessment team concluded that the military operation would require high-quality military commanders and troops, able to operate in complex scenarios of external and internal threats; good liaison, reconnaissance, information and surveillance; high operational mobility; and robust military capability to deal with any armed threat.

66. The military force would be headquartered in N'Djamena with a small staff and a liaison office in Bangui. Military operations would be controlled from a forward operational headquarters in Abéché, which would be co-located with the Mission regional office. The force would be organized in four sectors, three in Chad and one in the Central African Republic. Sector headquarters would be located in eastern Chad in the area of Iriba in the north, Adré in the centre and Goz Beida in the south. In the Central African Republic, the sector headquarters would be located in Birao, co-located with the Mission's liaison office in Birao.

67. Option A would be a force larger than a standard infantry brigade, comprising five infantry battalions, a force reconnaissance company and a force reserve of two infantry companies, supported by a military air component of 18 utility helicopters, two armed observation helicopters, an unmanned aerial vehicle detachment and one fixed-wing observation aircraft. The force would be enabled and supported by four engineer companies, an airbase engineering company, transport and logistic companies, a level two hospital in Abéché and an enhanced level one facility at Birao. The number of engineer units could be reduced after the initial establishment of the force. Some United Nations military observers could also be deployed, subject to security considerations. The total force would number approximately 6,000. The feasibility of this option would be largely dependent upon the availability of military aviation, which would give this force the flexibility needed to deploy its units quickly by air in order to meet operational requirements and establish a credible security presence over a wide area. At the same time, this force would occupy a relatively small number of bases with fewer troops than would otherwise be required if the military aviation resources identified in this option is not provided. It would require the acceptance of a higher degree of risk regarding the protection of civilians. This option would also render the force more vulnerable to the constraints of weather on operations. The generation of sufficient and capable military helicopters may be extremely challenging, based on previous experience, and failure to generate the aviation required would render this option unfeasible.

68. Option B would be a force the size of a standard infantry division, comprising nine infantry battalions, with two or three battalions in each sector in Chad and two infantry companies in the Central African Republic, a force reconnaissance company and a force reserve of a light battalion, supported by a military air component of nine utility helicopters, with two armed observation helicopters, unmanned aerial vehicle detachments and two fixed-wing observation aircraft. The total force would number some 10,900. This option places more reliance on infantry troops being in place to meet operational requirements, while sacrificing some air mobility. It offers a lower degree of risk regarding the protection of civilians and would be less vulnerable to the constraints of weather.

69. Should the situation in Chad or the Central African Republic deteriorate further during or after a United Nations deployment, provision should be made under either option for a rapidly deployable capacity, over the horizon, at a minimum of one further infantry battalion of 850 all ranks, authorized by the Council at the time of mandate approval, in order to reinforce the mission in extremis.

Police

70. As suggested in the report of my predecessor dated 22 December 2006, United Nations police would undertake to police refugee camps (12 locations) and support national law enforcement activities in the vicinity of those towns in eastern Chad that are associated with IDPs, refugees and humanitarian operations, namely Abéché, Bahai, Iriba, Farchana, Guereda and Goz Beida. These tasks could be performed only in combination with a United Nations military presence that would be required to provide wide area security for United Nations activities.

71. In the light of the difficulties related to identifying and deploying sufficient international personnel with appropriate language skills, the Mission would build on the approach taken by UNHCR in the refugee camps. In this context, it is assessed that some 800 Chadian gendarmes and police would be needed. These officers would be seconded to the United Nations and put under the operational command of the United Nations Police Commissioner. They would wear distinctive uniforms and would receive the basic logistic support normally provided to a United Nations police officer on duty in a peacekeeping operation, as well as a stipend.

72. The Mission would also require some 260 international United Nations police officers, who would be responsible for the selection of Chadian officers for secondment to the United Nations police, with special care taken with regard to ethnic and gender balance of those selected and intensive predeployment training of the Chadian officers selected. The United Nations police officers would advise Chadian personnel and monitor all police operations at all levels within the area of responsibility.

73. In the Central African Republic, the United Nations police presence would be limited to advising and providing technical assistance to the national police and gendarmerie. A group of 20 United Nations police officers would be deployed to Birao for this purpose, on the assumption that area security would be provided by a United Nations military presence. A liaison presence would also be established in Bangui to provide a link with key stakeholders, including the Government, BONUCA and international agencies.

Rule of law

74. The Mission would also require an internal advisory capacity on justice and prison systems, which would also liaise with local justice and prisons officials. The Mission would work in collaboration with the United Nations country team and other international actors.

Human rights

75. The human rights component would carry out human rights monitoring, investigations, reporting and training activities. Particular attention would be paid to the identification of violators of human rights and to the thematic areas of sexual violence and child protection. Human rights officers would be deployed throughout the Mission area and work in close collaboration with other components, including military, police, judicial, corrections and other civilian components, as well as United Nations agencies funds and programmes and other humanitarian actors on the ground to proactively identify potential threats to the civilian population. Human rights officers would also participate in joint analysis with other components of the Mission in order to help establish operational priorities.

76. The human rights component would work in collaboration with the United Nations country team and other actors on activities aimed at strengthening the promotion and protection of human rights. Regular public reports on the human rights situation in the mandated areas of deployment would be issued, with specific recommendations for corrective action by relevant actors.

Humanitarian liaison and coordination

77. Ongoing humanitarian operations in Chad and the Central African Republic would continue to be coordinated by the respective United Nations humanitarian coordinators. While this activity would take place separately from the work of the Mission, United Nations humanitarian coordinators would advise the Head of Mission on humanitarian matters with respect to the mission area and would participate in the Mission's senior management to this end. In addition, a number of humanitarian liaison officers would be deployed as part of the Mission, and based primarily in eastern Chad and north-eastern Central African Republic, to ensure appropriate liaison between the Mission, the United Nations country teams and the broader humanitarian community in those areas.

Public information

78. As indicated in the report of my predecessor dated 22 December 2006, an effective public information component would be crucial to ensure widespread understanding of the purpose, objectives and activities of the Mission. This would be accomplished through wide dissemination of consistent messages describing the work of the Mission, which would target the population living in the border areas covered by the Mission, as well as key stakeholders, including specific communities in the area of operations and the national armed forces. The public information component would also develop and disseminate messages focusing on reconciliation and the importance of peace and stability. To accomplish these tasks, the component should have a capacity for public outreach and media relations, and for print and radio production.

Gender

79. In accordance with Security Council resolution 1325 (2000), the Mission would ensure that gender is mainstreamed in all aspects of its work. A key objective would be to facilitate capacity-building support for both uniformed and civilian elements in the Mission on gender mainstreaming strategies. Technical support and advice would be provided to all Mission components to adequately respond to the identified priorities of women and girls in the sectors of security, protection and human rights.

80. The Mission would pay particular attention to the situation of women and girls directly affected by the conflict. The Mission would document the extent of violence against women and play an advocacy role with local and national authorities to protect civilians and most vulnerable groups. In collaboration with the United Nations agencies and civil society organizations, the Mission would provide support to the national authorities, including the armed forces, the gendarmes and police, to facilitate the implementation of policies and programmes to advance gender equality goals.

81. A gender action plan specifically targeted at eastern Chad and north-eastern Central African Republic would also be implemented and would focus on prevention and response measures to address the high rate of reported incidents of sexual and gender-based violence against refugees, internally displaced persons and civilian population. Addressing HIV/AIDS prevention would also be emphasized.

Conduct and discipline

82. A personnel conduct and discipline unit would be established within the Mission to support my Special Representative in developing strategies and mechanisms to prevent, identify and respond to all forms of misconduct, including sexual exploitation and abuse. The unit would work in collaboration with other components and offices of the Mission to put in place awareness-raising and training activities to prevent misconduct, establish networks of focal points to receive complaints and establish related data management and monitoring systems required to carry out this work. The Mission would also establish capacity for investigation of allegations of misconduct in accordance with established rules and procedures.

HIV/AIDS

83. As indicated in the report dated 22 December 2006, HIV prevalence in both Chad and the Central African Republic is high. Further to Security Council resolution 1308 (2000), the Mission would provide ongoing HIV/AIDS awareness and sensitization programmes for all Mission personnel, uniformed and civilian, including access to HIV voluntary counselling and testing in all areas of deployment. The HIV unit would collaborate with the United Nations county teams and civil society organizations to integrate HIV concerns into the mandate of the Mission, in particular the need to protect vulnerable populations from sexual and gender-based violence and to raise HIV awareness among refugees and IDPs.

Staff safety and security

84. In the light of complex staff security requirements in the Mission area, particularly in eastern Chad, a staff security coordination mechanism would be established in eastern Chad to ensure cooperation among organizations with security capacities in order to promote a safe and secure environment for mandate implementation and programme delivery activities. This mechanism would be essential, given the current United Nations security phase III and IV environment, and the different regional security requirements and threats. In the Central African Republic, existing staff safety and security mechanisms would be augmented in the north-east part of the country, in anticipation of an increase in personnel in that region.

Mine action

85. Although it is estimated that a landmine threat is fairly low in eastern Chad, and particularly along the border with the Central African Republic, there is a confirmed threat from the presence of explosive remnants of war and the potential for landmine use to disrupt the activities of the Mission. In this regard, a mine action unit would assess and verify all routes to be used by the Mission, the United Nations and the humanitarian agencies as safe for traffic. There would be a requirement to deploy a mine survey/explosive ordnance disposal capacity (two teams) to undertake the initial clearance work required to support the work of the Mission.

Mission support

86. The Mission Support Division would be responsible for establishing, operating and maintaining the infrastructure and providing the essential communication, mobility and sustainment capabilities required by the United Nations operation to carry out its responsibilities. As highlighted in my predecessor's report of 22 December 2006, the combination of the landlocked nature of both Chad and the Central African Republic, very harsh environmental conditions, scarcity of resources, and minimal infrastructure would complicate considerably the deployment of the United Nations operation and limit severely the United Nations ability to support its personnel. In particular, an intense rainy season lasting more than five months makes roads impassable for days at a time and turns scrub and forest into swamp. The transport of goods to the Mission would also pose an enormous challenge. As was indicated in the 22 December 2006 report, average transit time for a consignment from Douala in Cameroon to reach Bangui or N'Djamena is about six to eight weeks, depending on the season. Furthermore, when combined with the current level of activities of humanitarian agencies, there would be a clear risk of eroding the currently available natural resources, and water in particular. Any deployment would therefore need to be closely coordinated with the United Nations country teams and other stakeholders working in the concerned areas to assess its impact on the local communities.

87. Support for military units operating in eastern Chad and north-eastern Central African Republic would follow United Nations standards for self-sustainment. At the start-up of the Mission, substantial construction of work areas, living space and information technology, as well as security arrangements, would be required. Expeditious establishment of these facilities would likely require significant use of

commercial contractors. In addition, all logistical support into Chad and the Central African Republic would be channelled through two main corridors: from Douala in Cameroon and, to a more limited extent, from Benghazi in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya. In addition, it is important to stress that the rainy season in the area of operations would limit the possibility of introducing required material by road. In this regard, the early pre-positioning of strategic deployment stocks to N'Djamena and Bangui would be essential.

VI. Observations and recommendations

88. Eastern Chad is facing a multifaceted security and humanitarian crisis, which includes ongoing clashes between Government forces and Sudan-based Chadian rebels, cross-border attacks on civilians by Sudan-based militia, the presence of Sudanese rebels on Chadian territory, ethnic violence, internal displacement, intercommunal tensions and banditry. The result is an environment of uncertainty, vulnerability and victimization of the local communities and the 232,000 Sudanese refugees in the region, and, above all, of the 120,000 internally displaced persons in eastern Chad.

89. As the United Nations seeks to determine the most effective way to address these challenges, it is important to note that eastern Chad is not a conventional peacekeeping environment. Although the Chadian armed forces have recently pushed the rebels back to the border with Darfur or beyond, prospects for durable peace and security in the area are still unclear. In addition, the crisis in Darfur shows no signs of abating, and the ongoing unrest in that region is a major impediment to establishing peace and stability in eastern Chad. In Chad itself, hostilities between the Government and armed opposition groups continue, and efforts at political dialogue have not gained momentum. Intercommunal tensions, which constitute a threat to the civilian population, are also a cause for concern.

90. The open-ended deployment of a United Nations peacekeeping force into this challenging environment would therefore carry distinct and serious risks. Chief among these is the possibility that armed groups may view a United Nations force as interfering with their military agenda and decide to attack it. It would be imperative therefore to obtain assurances from Chadian rebel groups that they would recognize the impartial character of a United Nations presence. There is also the possibility that a United Nations force, while carrying out its protection functions in such a fluid environment, could find itself caught in the cross-fire between belligerents.

91. To mitigate these risks, a United Nations force should be clearly focused on two principal objectives: protecting civilians at risk, particularly internally displaced persons and refugees; and deterring cross-border attacks through its presence. Should the Security Council decide to establish such a force, I would recommend that option B (see para. 68 above) be selected, since its combination of size and mobility would provide the capacity to carry out the proposed tasks effectively and respond to unforeseen events. It will be essential, in this regard, for Member States, to provide as soon as possible, an indication of their readiness to make available the necessary well trained and equipped troops and police personnel. The size of the force would be kept under review and adjusted as the security situation improves.

92. The United Nations operation could also work in parallel to contribute to ongoing efforts to settle the crisis in Darfur and assist, as necessary, in developing a

political climate conducive to peace, stability and reconciliation in eastern Chad. In addition, it would be important to move forward expeditiously with the relocation of refugee camps that are near the border with the Sudan, in particular the camps of Am Nabak and Oure Cassoni, located near Bahai. Moving these camps to appropriate sites away from the border would make it easier to preserve their civilian and humanitarian character and to eliminate potential flash points on the border. However, significant national and international assistance would be required for this purpose.

93. The deployment of a multidimensional United Nations operation in eastern Chad will require the full support and cooperation of the Government. However, as mentioned in paragraph 33, President Déby expressed some concerns about the military component of the proposed mission during his meeting with the Assistant Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations on 5 February. I will inform the Security Council of President Déby's final decision in this regard, as soon as it is communicated to me.

94. In north-eastern Central African Republic, the situation is less acute, and the agreement between the Government and rebel groups to negotiate an end to their conflict is an encouraging development. At the same time, there is continued risk that violence may erupt again, as long as there is conflict across the border in the Sudan and eastern Chad, and lingering intercommunal tensions in the Vakaga prefecture. In this respect, a modest deployment of United Nation military and police personnel would have a stabilizing effect on the situation in north-eastern Central African Republic.

95. In conclusion, I would like to reiterate that responsibility for achieving a lasting solution to the crisis in Darfur, eastern Chad and north-eastern Central African Republic rests, first and foremost, with the leaders of these countries. I call on their Governments to move forward rapidly and to muster the political will to establish peace and stability in their countries and in the region. A concrete first step for Chad and the Sudan would be to implement the Tripoli and N'Djamena agreements as a matter of priority. In the Central African Republic, the political dialogue initiative must be given all the support required for it to take root. There is also a major role for the international community to play by sending a clear message that dialogue and reconciliation are the only acceptable and realistic paths to sustainable peace and development.

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Report of the Secretary-General on Chad and the Central African Republic

I. Introduction

1. In his report on Chad and the Central African Republic dated 22 December 2006 (S/2006/1019), submitted pursuant to paragraphs 9 (d) and 13 of Security Council resolution 1706 (2006), my predecessor provided an overview of the political, security, humanitarian and human rights situations in both countries and the challenges related to the protection of refugees, internally displaced persons and other civilians in areas near the border with the Sudan. The report also outlined some preliminary options regarding the possible mandate, structure and concept of operations of a multidimensional United Nations presence in both eastern Chad and north-eastern Central African Republic, which would seek to improve the security situation in the areas along the borders between those two countries and the Sudan.

2. The Security Council considered the report during informal consultations held on 10 January 2007. Subsequently, following a meeting held on 16 January 2007, the President of the Security Council issued a statement (S/PRST/2007/2) that took note of the report of 22 December 2006 and authorized the immediate return of the technical assessment mission to the region, in order to finalize recommendations on the size, structure and mandate of a United Nations multidimensional presence.

3. The 2007 presidential statement also requested that I deploy as soon as possible an advance mission to Chad and the Central African Republic, in consultation with their Governments, as envisaged in paragraph 88 of the 22 December 2006 report, in order to accelerate preparations for an early decision on the possible deployment of a multidimensional presence in those countries.

4. The present report reflects the findings of the second multidimensional technical assessment mission, which visited Chad and the Central African Republic from 21 January to 6 February 2007. It also includes a description of the advance mission and detailed proposals for the size, structure and mandate of a United Nations multidimensional presence in the two countries.

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II. Update on recent developments

A. Chad

5. Since my predecessor's report of 22 December 2006 was finalized, the situation in Chad has remained volatile and unpredictable. Fighting between the Chadian armed forces and rebel groups, some of which are reportedly armed and supported by the Sudan, and attacks by militia on the civilian population have continued to destabilize eastern Chad, leading to widespread insecurity and human rights violations, including continued internal displacement of civilian populations. To address the situation, the Government of Chad has maintained a state of emergency in Wadi Fira, Ouaddai and Salamat, the three regions in eastern Chad that border the Sudan and the Central African Republic, as well as in N'Djamena.

6. In a positive development, on 24 December 2006, the Government and one faction of the rebel group Front Uni pour le Changement (FUC) signed an agreement in Tripoli that, among other things, called for armed elements of FUC to be integrated into the Chadian armed forces and the Chadian gendarmerie. Despite some difficulties in implementing the agreement, FUC is reportedly being gradually integrated into the Chadian armed forces and the Chadian gendarmerie. However, the agreement was disparaged by other rebel groups, including the Union of Forces for Democracy and Development (UFDD), the Rally of Democratic Forces (RFD) and the Platform for Change, National Unity and Democracy, which questioned the military strength of FUC and decided, one day after the agreement was signed, to coordinate their military efforts against the Government.

7. Rebel activity continued throughout December 2006 and January 2007. On 13 January 2007, UFDD attacked and briefly occupied the town of Ounianga Kebir, located in the northern department of Tibesti, more than 350 kilometres west of the border with the Sudan. Then on 17 January 2007, UFDD and RFD combined forces to take the border town of Adé, following the relocation of a garrison of the Chadian armed forces from Adé to Goz Beida. The Chadian armed forces regained control of the town on 24 January, following an aerial attack on rebel positions.

8. In continuation of this pattern, on 1 February 2007 UFDD struck again, attacking the eastern town of Adré, which is located on the border with the Sudan, 30 kilometres west of El Geneina, the capital of West Darfur. Violent fighting ensued in the following days, with the Chadian armed forces maintaining control of the town and pushing the rebels back into the Sudan. Details of the attack were communicated to me in a note verbale dated 1 February 2007 from the Government of Chad. Despite these flare-ups, it can be said that the security situation in eastern Chad improved significantly in the second half of January. That was due in part to the successful counteroffensive, which enabled Chadian Government forces to push the rebels back to the immediate border area or, beyond, into Darfur.

9. While violence associated with rebel activities continues, it should be noted that civilians have generally not been targeted by the rebels. Militia attacks, on the other hand, have targeted civilians. Throughout late December and early January, militia groups attacked Chadian villages in the Dar Sila area of the Ouaddai region. In one particularly brutal assault, militia groups attacked Chadian civilians near the town of Koukou Angarana on 15 and 16 December 2006, killing 30, including local residents, internally displaced persons and a few Sudanese refugees who had

wandered outside their camps. That was followed on 16 December by heavy fighting between the Chadian armed forces and militia groups around the town of Habilé, which is in the same area, forcing 9,000 internally displaced people who had sought refuge around Habilé to move towards Koukou Angarana; that was the second time they had been forced to flee for their lives.

10. As a direct result of the ongoing violence and the attacks by militias on Chadian populations, the number of internally displaced persons in eastern Chad had risen from an estimated 92,000 in December 2006 to approximately 120,000 by 1 February 2007. Most of this new displacement occurred in the Dar Sila area. Meanwhile, the refugee population for all of eastern Chad has stabilized at around 232,000, of whom 220,000 are hosted in 12 camps supported by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), with the remainder living with local communities.

11. The increase in internally displaced persons (IDPs) has exacerbated the humanitarian crisis in eastern Chad. Newly displaced persons consistently settle on the periphery of refugee camps and existing towns or villages. Since direct assistance to internally displaced persons has thus far been insufficient, they are relying to some extent on refugees and local populations to share their meagre resources. This often leads to tension when those resources are particularly scarce or valuable, as is the case with firewood, fodder and water. In addition, thousands of items of unexploded ordnance are scattered in the vicinity of several localities, preventing access to those scarce resources. The decision of the Government to allocate $8 million to assist internally displaced persons is a constructive step, which should be complemented by additional international assistance.

12. The response to increased humanitarian needs in eastern Chad is also hampered by the security situation. In view of the continuing instability, relief organizations are required to take precautions, including limiting the number of staff operating in the region, and in some locations permitting them to move only with armed escort, thus making it difficult to ensure the safe provision of much needed assistance. However, contingency planning, including reliance on Chadian staff and the refugees themselves, has thus far prevented any major disruptions in essential services, notably the provision of food aid, health care and sanitation in refugee camps. The security situation has, however, hampered the provision of assistance to the IDPs.

B. Central African Republic

13. In the Central African Republic, there has been noteworthy progress on the political front since my predecessor's report dated 22 December 2006. The President of the Central African Republic agreed to engage in an inclusive dialogue with opposition parties and representatives of the armed rebellion. A Central African civil society group, the Group of the Wise, comprising representatives of all the religions present in the country, the leader of the follow-up committee on the implementation of the results of the 2003 national dialogue and the leader of the national human rights associations, is leading the current dialogue process. The Group is being assisted by the United Nations Peacebuilding Support Office in the Central African Republic (BONUCA).

14. On 28 January 2007, President Francois Bozizé met with the representatives of various rebel groups operating in the Central African Republic in Syrte, Libya, and, on 2 February 2007, the Government of the Central African Republic and those rebel groups signed a peace agreement that provided, inter alia, for the immediate cessation of hostilities. The next step in the dialogue process will be the holding of further consultations and developing agreements for national reconciliation. The conclusive phase of the dialogue is scheduled to be held in the coming months, when it is expected that a comprehensive accord will be signed among all the national stakeholders.

15. Meanwhile, civilian populations have started to return to the towns in the north-east part of the country, which had been occupied by rebels and subsequently recaptured by the forces of the Central African armed forces (FACA), supported by the subregional multinational force (FOMUC) of the Central African Economic and Monetary Community (CEMAC), and the French forces in the Central African Republic.

16. The re-establishment of Government presence in Birao has also allowed humanitarian actors to initiate assessments in the prefecture of Vakaga. Their findings confirmed that some towns and villages have suffered significant destruction and segments of the population may remain internally displaced and fear renewed attacks, as well as reprisals on the part of the national army for their alleged support to the rebellion.

17. While the focus of the technical assessment mission was on north-eastern Central African Republic, the security situation in the north-western part of the country remains volatile. On 15 January 2007, a group of rebels reportedly attacked the town of Paoua in the north-west part of the country, causing casualties and injuries. In this context, and as indicated in the report dated 22 December 2006, the humanitarian situation in north-west Central African Republic is a matter of serious concern, as more than 70,000 internally displaced persons are living under threat of indiscriminate violence.

III. Technical assessment mission

A. Programme of work

18. The second technical assessment mission to Chad and the Central African Republic was led by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and included staff from the Department of Political Affairs, the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, UNHCR, the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, and the United Nations Department of Safety and Security.

19. The assessment mission arrived in Chad on 21 January 2006, for two days of consultations with Chadian officials, including the Minister for Foreign Affairs, the Chief of Military Staff and the inter-ministerial committee charged with coordinating contact with the assessment mission, and with the United Nations country team, the diplomatic community, humanitarian organizations and other stakeholders.

20. On 23 January 2007, the assessment mission, accompanied by liaison officers from the Chadian armed forces, the gendarmerie and the police, travelled to Abéché

in eastern Chad, where it undertook consultations with local authorities, representatives of the United Nations country team and humanitarian organizations.

21. From 24 to 28 January, the assessment mission visited the towns of Adré, Bahai, Biltine, Farchana, Goz Beïda, Iriba, Koukou Angarana and Tine. It also visited the refugee camps and internally displaced persons settlements close to those locations, including Farchana, Gaga, Goz Amer, Iridimi and Oure Cassoni. The team received direct operational support throughout its visit to Chad from UNHCR and vital helicopter transportation from the French military stationed in Abéché.

22. On 30 January the assessment mission travelled to Bangui for consultations with Government officials and representatives from the armed forces, police and gendarmerie; briefings with BONUCA and the United Nations country team; and a meeting with the diplomatic community.

23. From 31 January to 1 February, members of the assessment mission travelled to the prefecture of Vakaga of the Central African Republic, for a first-hand assessment of the situation in the town of Birao and the surrounding area. That group subsequently travelled to Am Dafok on the border with the Sudan for additional fact-finding.

24. The assessment mission returned to N'Djamena from 2 to 6 February, where it was joined by Hédi Annabi, Assistant Secretary-General for peacekeeping operations, who met with President Déby on 5 February 2007, and with other senior Government officials, as well as the United Nations country team and members of the diplomatic community in N'Djamena. The assessment team also shared its findings and preliminary conclusions with the inter-ministerial committee on 5 February.

B. Key findings: Chad

25. During the visit of the assessment mission to eastern Chad, local Chadian authorities and affected populations, as well as many humanitarian organizations expressed broad support for the early deployment of a multidimensional United Nations presence that would focus on the protection of civilians in the area and defusing border tensions. Chadian authorities, including the Minister for Foreign Affairs, and the members of the diplomatic community in Chad were also of the view that a United Nations deployment should not be made directly contingent upon the establishment of an inclusive dialogue in Chad.

26. The assessment mission also contacted representatives of some rebel groups to inform them of the possible deployment of a multidimensional United Nations presence near the border with the Sudan. In response, rebel interlocutors stressed that they would not object to the presence of an impartial United Nations operation. However, if they perceived that the United Nations was actively working in support of Government military operations, they would view the United Nations force as a belligerent.

27. In assessing the security situation in eastern Chad, it is evident that activities of armed rebel movements seeking to overthrow the Government continue to destabilize the area. This is most clearly illustrated by the situation in Adré, which was attacked by rebel groups on 1 February 2007. The Chadian armed forces are focused on addressing the rebel threat, which is affecting their ability to provide

protection to the civilian population and ensure maintenance of law and order throughout the eastern part of the country.

28. During discussions with representatives of internally displaced persons and refugees it was also made clear that militia groups based in the Sudan and characterized as "Janjaweed", who cross into Chad to attack civilians, were seen as the foremost threat to their safety. Chadian civilians seemed to be the most frequent target of those attacks, which resulted in the partial destruction of the internally displaced persons site at Habilé, in the Salamat prefecture.

29. The mission also identified or confirmed other threats to civilian populations, in addition to incursions from the Sudan. The first of these was intercommunal tension and violence, particularly in the Dar Sila department of the Ouaddai region, where compelling evidence, including confidential testimony, indicated that local populations and internally displaced persons had been attacked, displaced and killed by militia largely composed of Chadian elements.

30. In addition, the assessment mission received numerous credible reports that Sudanese rebel groups were operating and openly recruiting in and around Oure Cassoni and Am Nabak camps near the border with the Sudan in the Wadi Fira region, as well as in other refugee camps, and that there were children among those being recruited. Although the Government and UNHCR agreed that these camps, which are very close to the border, should be moved deeper into the Chadian territory to ensure that their civilian and humanitarian character are preserved, no alternative suitable sites have been identified.

31. In the meantime, the security aspects of the crisis remain the focus of Chadian authorities. The Government has made clear that it will not engage rebel groups in dialogue until they hand over their weapons. As a result, there is as yet no substantial political or reconciliation process in place to formally identify and address grievances of Chadian rebel groups or to discuss the causes of intercommunal violence, which poses a serious threat to the safety and security of Chadian civilians. In addition, it seems that traditional conflict resolution mechanisms have been overwhelmed by the intensity and frequency of the violence of the last two years, although subsequent to the signing of the agreement between FUC and the Government on 24 December, a reconciliation agreement was signed between the Dedjo and Arab groups in south-eastern Chad, to address the requirements for self-defence, in response to repeated attacks of "Janjaweed" militia.

32. During the course of its visit, the assessment mission also had first-hand experience of the logistical challenges related to deploying a multidimensional mission to eastern Chad. This vast territory of approximately 165,000 square kilometres is criss-crossed by wadis (riverbeds) that, while dry for much of the year, can flood in minutes during the rainy season (May-October). Most roads are sand or dirt tracks that become impassable during this period, cutting off large sections of territory for long periods. In addition, there is only one airstrip in the region capable of servicing large aircraft, and little or no communications infrastructure in place.

33. At the conclusion of the assessment mission, President Déby received Mr. Annabi on 5 February in Am Timam in eastern Chad. The President recalled that he had previously given his agreement in principle to the deployment of a United Nations multidimensional presence. However, he expressed concerns about the

military component of the proposed mission. He stressed that Chad had asked the Security Council in November 2006 to deploy a "civilian force" to the camps in eastern Chad. The President emphasized that the Government of Chad had not requested the deployment of a military force. Furthermore, he expressed the view that the international community was considering the deployment of a United Nations military force in Chad because the Sudan had refused to accept the deployment of a United Nations operation in Darfur. President Déby stressed that he wished to see additional details about the proposed operation, in writing, before taking a final decision. Accordingly, in addition to briefing extensively and in detail the Chadian inter-ministerial committee on its findings at the end of the mission, the technical assessment mission handed over, on 6 February, to General N'Gomine, military coordinator of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Chair of the inter-ministerial committee, an aide-memoire describing its proposed recommendations on the mandate, size and structure of a United Nations multidimensional operation in eastern Chad. The technical assessment mission pointed out that those recommendations were subject to the approval of the Secretary-General and ultimately the Security Council.

C. Key findings: Central African Republic

34. Much of the civilian population that had fled Birao during the hostilities of late November 2006 had returned, and the situation in Birao, as well as Am Dafok on the border with the Sudan, appeared to have stabilized owing to the presence of FACA troops, the gendarmerie and the police in both towns, along with the presence of a small French detachment in Birao. However, there are still pockets of insecurity in the Vakaga prefecture, in the area of Gordil and Tiringoulou, and north of Bria. Some sources estimate the number of internally displaced persons in the region (mainly of the Goula ethnic group) at around 10,000. Remnants of the rebel groups are still reportedly present in those areas.

35. In addition, there are still a number of other factors contributing to insecurity, including criminal elements and poachers who take advantage of the lawlessness in the area and porous borders with the Sudan. The assessment mission was also made aware of allegations of human rights violations and violence targeting civilian populations, including by FACA in reprisal for those communities, which are perceived as supporting the rebels.

36. Civilians in the Vakaga prefecture are making every effort to return to a normal life. While there is no evidence of a humanitarian emergency at present, isolation, economic marginalization and recent insecurity have created serious relief and recovery needs that, for the time being, the central Government seems unable to address.

37. The team noted that the decision of the Government of the Central African Republic to close its border with the Sudan is having a negative impact on the traditional trade routes from the Sudan into the Vakaga prefecture. Local populations are almost entirely dependent on the free flow of goods and services across that border.

38. During its brief visit, the assessment mission did not see compelling evidence that the situation in the Vakaga prefecture is directly related to the crisis in Darfur. However, mindful of the events of October to December 2006, when a number of

towns in the Vakaga prefecture were occupied by rebel groups that had allegedly received external support, the assessment mission took note of the Government's view that the two situations are linked. It also noted the Government's call for the United Nations deployment to address the possible impact of the Darfur crisis on the Central African Republic.

IV. Advance mission

A. Background

39. In consideration of the above, and pursuant to the presidential statement issued by the Security Council on 16 January 2007 (S/PRST/2007/2), I have initiated the necessary steps to deploy an advance mission to Chad and the Central African Republic. The advance mission, which would be known as the United Nations Mission in Chad and the Central African Republic, or Mission des Nations Unies au Tchad et en République Centrafricaine (MiNUTAC), would prepare for the possible multidimensional presence foreshadowed in the presidential statement of 16 January 2007.

40. Throughout the technical assessment mission the broad parameters of the advance mission were discussed with local authorities and other stakeholders. In the light of those discussions and based on the guidance provided by the Security Council, preparations for its establishment are currently under way as follows.

B. Mandate

41. In accordance with the presidential statement of 16 January 2007, the mandate of the Mission has been derived from paragraph 88 of the report of the Secretary-General of 22 December 2006 on Chad and the Central African Republic. The Mission's activities would therefore focus on those preparations, which would position the multidimensional presence to protect civilians and assist in mitigating the spill-over of the Darfur conflict. This would require collecting information on the situation in eastern Chad in order to develop a full understanding of the security and protection challenges that a United Nations multidimensional presence would face.

42. Should the Security Council authorize a multidimensional United Nations presence in Chad and the Central African Republic, it is anticipated that the Mission would be merged into that operation.

C. Tasks

43. To accomplish the above, the Mission would have to establish effective liaison with all key stakeholders (including the Governments, the national military, police and gendarmerie, all credible opposition groups, French forces, the humanitarian community, civil society, the African Union Mission in the Sudan (AMIS), the United Nations Mission in the Sudan (UNMIS) and FOMUC) to initiate preparatory activities, including further detailed planning and logistical measures in anticipation of the deployment of a multidimensional United Nations operation, support the

establishment of a framework for constructive dialogue between the Governments concerned in the region and between the Government and opposition groups, liaise with the United Nations country teams in both Chad and the Central African Republic, and BONUCA in the Central African Republic to ensure complementarities, liaise with the broader humanitarian community in the two countries, and develop mechanisms that will contribute to improving the security environment and protecting civilians with a view to contributing to a reduction of violence in the region.

D. Composition

44. The Mission would be led by a Head of Mission, who would be the Representative of the Secretary-General for Chad and would be responsible for implementing the peacekeeping mandate in north-eastern Central African Republic. The Mission would be comprised of political, civil affairs, legal, military, police, judicial, corrections, humanitarian, human rights, mine action, public information, conduct and discipline, safety and security, administrative and mission support personnel who would implement the mandate of the Mission under the overall supervision of the Head of Mission.

E. Location

45. The Mission headquarters would be located in N'Djamena, where the Head of Mission would be based. A regional office in Abéché and a liaison office in Bangui would also be established. At a later stage, security conditions permitting, the Mission would also establish multidisciplinary field offices in Iriba, Adré and Goz Beida in eastern Chad and Birao in north-eastern Central African Republic.

F. Size

46. In addition to the Head of Mission, the Mission would include military, police and civilian personnel. A total of 35 military officers would establish liaison relationships with the Chadian armed forces, FACA and other stakeholders in N'Djamena and Bangui and in the vicinity of the five identified field offices, and would collect information in order to inform and finalize detailed plans for the envisaged multidimensional presence. In addition, 39 United Nations police officers would finalize specific aspects of a detailed strategy to address policing requirements of refugee camps, key towns where humanitarian field offices are located, humanitarian commuting routes and areas of IDP concentrations, assist in the process of identifying Chadian police and gendarmes for secondment, training and eventual deployment to the envisaged peacekeeping operation, prepare agreements with the Government of Chad regarding division of responsibilities between United Nations police and Chadian law enforcement officials, and initiate preparations for the training and deployment of United Nations police to eastern Chad. The activities of United Nations military and police personnel would be complemented by the work of an appropriate number of substantive civilian staff in the areas of political affairs, human rights, the rule of law, humanitarian liaison, public information, mine action and safety and security. The Mission would also

include the necessary mission support personnel, who would be responsible for all aspects of logistical and administrative preparation for the possible establishment of a multidimensional operation.

V. Proposed United Nations multidimensional presence in Chad and the Central African Republic

A. Mandate

47. Should the Security Council decide to establish a multidimensional United Nations presence in eastern Chad and the north-eastern part of the Central African Republic, I would recommend that it be entrusted with the following main tasks, which take into account the continuing instability along the borders between the Sudan, Chad and the Central African Republic and the threat that this poses to the safety of the civilian population and the conduct of humanitarian operations:

Security and protection of civilians

- Assist in protecting civilians at risk, including internally displaced persons and refugees, within the capabilities of the United Nations operation and in its areas of deployment.
- Assist with the maintenance of law and order in the refugee camps, key towns where humanitarian field offices are located, humanitarian commuting routes, internally displaced persons sites and host communities.
- Deploy at key locations in the border area, with a view to reducing tension and facilitating confidence-building.
- Liaise with the national army, the gendarmerie, the police force, judicial authorities, and prison officials in Chad and the Central African Republic to contribute to the creation of a more secure environment in eastern Chad and north-eastern Central African Republic.
- Facilitate the provision and the free movement of humanitarian assistance.
- Liaise with the Government of Chad and UNHCR in support of their efforts to relocate refugee camps in close proximity to the border, including with regard to the provision of logistical support for the relocation of such camps.
- Take all necessary measures to protect United Nations personnel, facilities, installations and equipment and ensure the security and freedom of movement of its personnel.
- Liaise closely with the African Union, AMIS, UNMIS and the Government of the Sudan to exchange information on emerging threats in the border region.

Good offices

- Facilitate improvement of relations between Chad and the Sudan and between the Central African Republic and the Sudan, particularly with regard to the implementation of the Tripoli and N'Djamena Agreements.

- Support, as necessary, the efforts of the Government of Chad to establish a sustained political dialogue with unarmed opposition groups and coordinate with BONUCA regarding its support to similar efforts by the Government of the Central African Republic.
- Assist, as necessary, in developing an appropriate framework for the cessation of hostilities, and reconciliation between the Governments and armed opposition groups.

Human rights

- Contribute to the promotion and protection of human rights by monitoring, documenting and reporting on violations in eastern Chad and north-eastern Central African Republic.
- Conduct preliminary investigations in cases of major human rights violations in eastern Chad and north-eastern Central African Republic, with particular attention to sexual and gender-based violence, and to recommend corrective action to relevant actors.
- Support, within its capabilities, efforts aimed at strengthening capacity of local authorities and civil society through training in international human rights standards.

B. Area of operations

48. The area of operations of the Mission would be eastern Chad, specifically, the Wadi Fira, Ouaddai and Salamat regions and the Ennedi Est department; and north-eastern Central African Republic, including the Vakaga prefecture and areas of Haute-Kotto prefecture that border the Sudan.

C. Mission structure

49. The United Nations presence in Chad and the Central African Republic would be a multidimensional operation composed of several components, led by a Head of Mission, who would be my Special Representative for Chad, and would be responsible for implementing the peacekeeping mandate in north-eastern Central African Republic. In this regard, my Special Representative would have overall authority over the activities of the United Nations, providing overall management and policy guidance and ensuring that all United Nations activities pursue a coordinated and coherent approach in the Mission's area of operation, in accordance with established United Nations policy.

50. The senior leadership of the Mission, which would be based at the Mission headquarters in N'Djamena, would also include a Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General, a Chief of Staff, a Force Commander at the rank of Major General, a Police Commissioner and a Director of Administration. This senior management team would report directly to my Special Representative. In order to ensure effective liaison between the Mission and the aid community on matters pertaining to humanitarian affairs, the United Nations resident/humanitarian coordinator for Chad would be a member of the Mission's senior management team, while retaining his/her relevant reporting lines to the Emergency Relief Coordinator

and the United Nations Development Programme Administrator. The Mission headquarters would also include representatives of all substantive components, as well as the necessary safety and security and mission support personnel.

51. A joint mission analysis cell would be established under the direction of the Head of Mission at its headquarters in N'Djamena to collect and analyse information and ensure that the views and expertise of all relevant components of the Mission are reflected in informing his or her decisions. To that end, the cell would be staffed with military, police, political affairs, safety and security, humanitarian and human rights personnel and other components, as required. The mission-wide analysis work of the cell would be complemented by a joint operations centre, which would be established in the regional office in Abéché and would be staffed with the same cross-section of Mission personnel as the cell. The joint operations centre would focus on providing real-time information and situational awareness to the Head of Mission and senior management.

52. The majority of the Mission personnel would be based in eastern Chad. The Mission would therefore establish a regional office in Abéché, which would also serve as the forward headquarters for the military and police component of the Mission. Conduct of the day-to-day functions of the regional office would be managed by a Deputy Special Representative, who would be supported by a regional management team comprised of a Senior Political Affairs Officer, a Deputy Force Commander, a Deputy Police Commissioner and a Deputy Chief of Administration, as well as civil affairs, human rights, humanitarian liaison, public information, mission support and safety and security personnel.

53. To cover the large territory of eastern Chad effectively, it would be essential for the Mission to be forward leaning, and to establish multidimensional field offices in the following key locations: Iriba, Adré and Goz Beida and, possibly, a liaison office in Biltine. Smaller liaison offices could also be established in Bahai and Nzili. These offices would report to my Special Representative through his Deputy in Abéché.

54. With regard to the Central African Republic, the Mission would establish a liaison office in Bangui, which would be co-located and work closely with BONUCA. It would be managed by a senior political affairs officer and a civilian liaison officer, and would include one military officer, one police officer, one human rights officer and one humanitarian affairs liaison officer, as well as a small mission support component. Liaison with senior levels of the Government of the Central African Republic in Bangui would continue to be led by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for the Central African Republic.

55. In north-eastern Central African Republic, the Mission would establish a multidimensional presence in the town of Birao, to include a small civil affairs, military and police presence, as well as human rights, humanitarian liaison and mission support personnel.

56. The Mission would be deployed in phases, with the first priority being the establishment of a viable regional office and forward headquarters in Abéché, to be followed by the establishment of field offices in eastern Chad and, finally, the establishment of the liaison and field office in the Central African Republic.

D. Component activities

Good offices and civil affairs

57. The Mission would include good offices and civil affairs components. The good offices component would provide support and advice to my Special Representative in the performance of his/her tasks, as described in paragraph 49 above. To this end, the good offices component would consult regularly with key national and regional stakeholders and would monitor and provide analysis on major political and administrative developments. The component would also be responsible for reporting to United Nations headquarters. The civil affairs component would liaise with the local authorities and civil society in the areas of deployment to ensure a constructive relationship between these stakeholders and the Mission, including through exchange of information. Civil affairs officers would also promote and support local reconciliation initiatives. Both the good offices and civil affairs components would have staff in N'Djamena and in field locations in eastern Chad and north-eastern Central African Republic, as well as in the liaison office in Bangui.

Military component

58. The military component would assist in protecting civilians at risk, facilitate delivery of humanitarian relief, and seek through its presence to reduce tension and deter conflict, with a view to establishing a more secure environment in its area of deployment.

59. Liaison with all relevant stakeholders, especially the armed forces of Chad and the Central African Republic and any other armed elements present in the area, would be critical to ensure an understanding of, and respect for, the impartial character of the United Nations force. Close liaison with AMIS and UNMIS should also be established for the exchange of information on potential threats developing on either side of the border, in order to provide early warning.

60. A framework of infantry battalions would be deployed to provide an effective presence through ground and air patrols, day and night, in order to reassure and discourage attacks against the civilian population. The provision of wide area security would also expand the zone in which humanitarian actors could safely operate. Night patrolling would be particularly important and the battalions with supporting aviation should be capable of and equipped for night operations. To achieve an early effect on the ground, the rapid deployment of a minimum of two infantry battalions with engineer and medical support would be required.

61. In order to identify emerging threats, the force should possess surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities such as observation aircraft, armed helicopters and unmanned aerial vehicles, as well as ground reconnaissance elements capable of long-range patrols. In order to react effectively to impeding threats to the civilian population, the military force must be capable and ready to act. The force should be authorized to take robust action, supported by appropriate rules of engagement, and be equipped to respond robustly to any hostile action. Armed helicopters would provide an effective and rapid response, as well as quick reaction forces at force and sector levels, deployed in armoured personnel carriers, high mobility vehicles and military aviation.

62. To reduce tensions in the border area and deter conflict, United Nations military forces would patrol and observe potential flashpoints in the area of operations. This would not interfere with the sovereign responsibility of the Chadian and Central African Republic authorities to secure their border with the Sudan. The United Nations military forces could also investigate and verify allegations of hostile actions in the Chad-Sudan border region, and could subsequently provide the Security Council with an assessment of such incidents.

63. In the Central African Republic, a small security presence would be needed to assist in confidence-building and deter conflict. Such a presence could be provided by a United Nations deployment of approximately 500 personnel.

64. Military engineers would be critical in each sector, initially to construct "bare-base" camps and then to improve the force's mobility by constructing helicopter landing grounds and improving tracks. The force would also require medical and logistic enabling capabilities.

65. In summary, the assessment team concluded that the military operation would require high-quality military commanders and troops, able to operate in complex scenarios of external and internal threats; good liaison, reconnaissance, information and surveillance; high operational mobility; and robust military capability to deal with any armed threat.

66. The military force would be headquartered in N'Djamena with a small staff and a liaison office in Bangui. Military operations would be controlled from a forward operational headquarters in Abéché, which would be co-located with the Mission regional office. The force would be organized in four sectors, three in Chad and one in the Central African Republic. Sector headquarters would be located in eastern Chad in the area of Iriba in the north, Adré in the centre and Goz Beida in the south. In the Central African Republic, the sector headquarters would be located in Birao, co-located with the Mission's liaison office in Birao.

67. Option A would be a force larger than a standard infantry brigade, comprising five infantry battalions, a force reconnaissance company and a force reserve of two infantry companies, supported by a military air component of 18 utility helicopters, two armed observation helicopters, an unmanned aerial vehicle detachment and one fixed-wing observation aircraft. The force would be enabled and supported by four engineer companies, an airbase engineering company, transport and logistic companies, a level two hospital in Abéché and an enhanced level one facility at Birao. The number of engineer units could be reduced after the initial establishment of the force. Some United Nations military observers could also be deployed, subject to security considerations. The total force would number approximately 6,000. The feasibility of this option would be largely dependent upon the availability of military aviation, which would give this force the flexibility needed to deploy its units quickly by air in order to meet operational requirements and establish a credible security presence over a wide area. At the same time, this force would occupy a relatively small number of bases with fewer troops than would otherwise be required if the military aviation resources identified in this option is not provided. It would require the acceptance of a higher degree of risk regarding the protection of civilians. This option would also render the force more vulnerable to the constraints of weather on operations. The generation of sufficient and capable military helicopters may be extremely challenging, based on previous experience, and failure to generate the aviation required would render this option unfeasible.

68. Option B would be a force the size of a standard infantry division, comprising nine infantry battalions, with two or three battalions in each sector in Chad and two infantry companies in the Central African Republic, a force reconnaissance company and a force reserve of a light battalion, supported by a military air component of nine utility helicopters, with two armed observation helicopters, unmanned aerial vehicle detachments and two fixed-wing observation aircraft. The total force would number some 10,900. This option places more reliance on infantry troops being in place to meet operational requirements, while sacrificing some air mobility. It offers a lower degree of risk regarding the protection of civilians and would be less vulnerable to the constraints of weather.

69. Should the situation in Chad or the Central African Republic deteriorate further during or after a United Nations deployment, provision should be made under either option for a rapidly deployable capacity, over the horizon, at a minimum of one further infantry battalion of 850 all ranks, authorized by the Council at the time of mandate approval, in order to reinforce the mission in extremis.

Police

70. As suggested in the report of my predecessor dated 22 December 2006, United Nations police would undertake to police refugee camps (12 locations) and support national law enforcement activities in the vicinity of those towns in eastern Chad that are associated with IDPs, refugees and humanitarian operations, namely Abéché, Bahai, Iriba, Farchana, Guereda and Goz Beida. These tasks could be performed only in combination with a United Nations military presence that would be required to provide wide area security for United Nations activities.

71. In the light of the difficulties related to identifying and deploying sufficient international personnel with appropriate language skills, the Mission would build on the approach taken by UNHCR in the refugee camps. In this context, it is assessed that some 800 Chadian gendarmes and police would be needed. These officers would be seconded to the United Nations and put under the operational command of the United Nations Police Commissioner. They would wear distinctive uniforms and would receive the basic logistic support normally provided to a United Nations police officer on duty in a peacekeeping operation, as well as a stipend.

72. The Mission would also require some 260 international United Nations police officers, who would be responsible for the selection of Chadian officers for secondment to the United Nations police, with special care taken with regard to ethnic and gender balance of those selected and intensive predeployment training of the Chadian officers selected. The United Nations police officers would advise Chadian personnel and monitor all police operations at all levels within the area of responsibility.

73. In the Central African Republic, the United Nations police presence would be limited to advising and providing technical assistance to the national police and gendarmerie. A group of 20 United Nations police officers would be deployed to Birao for this purpose, on the assumption that area security would be provided by a United Nations military presence. A liaison presence would also be established in Bangui to provide a link with key stakeholders, including the Government, BONUCA and international agencies.

Rule of law

74. The Mission would also require an internal advisory capacity on justice and prison systems, which would also liaise with local justice and prisons officials. The Mission would work in collaboration with the United Nations country team and other international actors.

Human rights

75. The human rights component would carry out human rights monitoring, investigations, reporting and training activities. Particular attention would be paid to the identification of violators of human rights and to the thematic areas of sexual violence and child protection. Human rights officers would be deployed throughout the Mission area and work in close collaboration with other components, including military, police, judicial, corrections and other civilian components, as well as United Nations agencies funds and programmes and other humanitarian actors on the ground to proactively identify potential threats to the civilian population. Human rights officers would also participate in joint analysis with other components of the Mission in order to help establish operational priorities.

76. The human rights component would work in collaboration with the United Nations country team and other actors on activities aimed at strengthening the promotion and protection of human rights. Regular public reports on the human rights situation in the mandated areas of deployment would be issued, with specific recommendations for corrective action by relevant actors.

Humanitarian liaison and coordination

77. Ongoing humanitarian operations in Chad and the Central African Republic would continue to be coordinated by the respective United Nations humanitarian coordinators. While this activity would take place separately from the work of the Mission, United Nations humanitarian coordinators would advise the Head of Mission on humanitarian matters with respect to the mission area and would participate in the Mission's senior management to this end. In addition, a number of humanitarian liaison officers would be deployed as part of the Mission, and based primarily in eastern Chad and north-eastern Central African Republic, to ensure appropriate liaison between the Mission, the United Nations country teams and the broader humanitarian community in those areas.

Public information

78. As indicated in the report of my predecessor dated 22 December 2006, an effective public information component would be crucial to ensure widespread understanding of the purpose, objectives and activities of the Mission. This would be accomplished through wide dissemination of consistent messages describing the work of the Mission, which would target the population living in the border areas covered by the Mission, as well as key stakeholders, including specific communities in the area of operations and the national armed forces. The public information component would also develop and disseminate messages focusing on reconciliation and the importance of peace and stability. To accomplish these tasks, the component should have a capacity for public outreach and media relations, and for print and radio production.

Gender

79. In accordance with Security Council resolution 1325 (2000), the Mission would ensure that gender is mainstreamed in all aspects of its work. A key objective would be to facilitate capacity-building support for both uniformed and civilian elements in the Mission on gender mainstreaming strategies. Technical support and advice would be provided to all Mission components to adequately respond to the identified priorities of women and girls in the sectors of security, protection and human rights.

80. The Mission would pay particular attention to the situation of women and girls directly affected by the conflict. The Mission would document the extent of violence against women and play an advocacy role with local and national authorities to protect civilians and most vulnerable groups. In collaboration with the United Nations agencies and civil society organizations, the Mission would provide support to the national authorities, including the armed forces, the gendarmes and police, to facilitate the implementation of policies and programmes to advance gender equality goals.

81. A gender action plan specifically targeted at eastern Chad and north-eastern Central African Republic would also be implemented and would focus on prevention and response measures to address the high rate of reported incidents of sexual and gender-based violence against refugees, internally displaced persons and civilian population. Addressing HIV/AIDS prevention would also be emphasized.

Conduct and discipline

82. A personnel conduct and discipline unit would be established within the Mission to support my Special Representative in developing strategies and mechanisms to prevent, identify and respond to all forms of misconduct, including sexual exploitation and abuse. The unit would work in collaboration with other components and offices of the Mission to put in place awareness-raising and training activities to prevent misconduct, establish networks of focal points to receive complaints and establish related data management and monitoring systems required to carry out this work. The Mission would also establish capacity for investigation of allegations of misconduct in accordance with established rules and procedures.

HIV/AIDS

83. As indicated in the report dated 22 December 2006, HIV prevalence in both Chad and the Central African Republic is high. Further to Security Council resolution 1308 (2000), the Mission would provide ongoing HIV/AIDS awareness and sensitization programmes for all Mission personnel, uniformed and civilian, including access to HIV voluntary counselling and testing in all areas of deployment. The HIV unit would collaborate with the United Nations county teams and civil society organizations to integrate HIV concerns into the mandate of the Mission, in particular the need to protect vulnerable populations from sexual and gender-based violence and to raise HIV awareness among refugees and IDPs.

Staff safety and security

84. In the light of complex staff security requirements in the Mission area, particularly in eastern Chad, a staff security coordination mechanism would be established in eastern Chad to ensure cooperation among organizations with security capacities in order to promote a safe and secure environment for mandate implementation and programme delivery activities. This mechanism would be essential, given the current United Nations security phase III and IV environment, and the different regional security requirements and threats. In the Central African Republic, existing staff safety and security mechanisms would be augmented in the north-east part of the country, in anticipation of an increase in personnel in that region.

Mine action

85. Although it is estimated that a landmine threat is fairly low in eastern Chad, and particularly along the border with the Central African Republic, there is a confirmed threat from the presence of explosive remnants of war and the potential for landmine use to disrupt the activities of the Mission. In this regard, a mine action unit would assess and verify all routes to be used by the Mission, the United Nations and the humanitarian agencies as safe for traffic. There would be a requirement to deploy a mine survey/explosive ordnance disposal capacity (two teams) to undertake the initial clearance work required to support the work of the Mission.

Mission support

86. The Mission Support Division would be responsible for establishing, operating and maintaining the infrastructure and providing the essential communication, mobility and sustainment capabilities required by the United Nations operation to carry out its responsibilities. As highlighted in my predecessor's report of 22 December 2006, the combination of the landlocked nature of both Chad and the Central African Republic, very harsh environmental conditions, scarcity of resources, and minimal infrastructure would complicate considerably the deployment of the United Nations operation and limit severely the United Nations ability to support its personnel. In particular, an intense rainy season lasting more than five months makes roads impassable for days at a time and turns scrub and forest into swamp. The transport of goods to the Mission would also pose an enormous challenge. As was indicated in the 22 December 2006 report, average transit time for a consignment from Douala in Cameroon to reach Bangui or N'Djamena is about six to eight weeks, depending on the season. Furthermore, when combined with the current level of activities of humanitarian agencies, there would be a clear risk of eroding the currently available natural resources, and water in particular. Any deployment would therefore need to be closely coordinated with the United Nations country teams and other stakeholders working in the concerned areas to assess its impact on the local communities.

87. Support for military units operating in eastern Chad and north-eastern Central African Republic would follow United Nations standards for self-sustainment. At the start-up of the Mission, substantial construction of work areas, living space and information technology, as well as security arrangements, would be required. Expeditious establishment of these facilities would likely require significant use of

commercial contractors. In addition, all logistical support into Chad and the Central African Republic would be channelled through two main corridors: from Douala in Cameroon and, to a more limited extent, from Benghazi in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya. In addition, it is important to stress that the rainy season in the area of operations would limit the possibility of introducing required material by road. In this regard, the early pre-positioning of strategic deployment stocks to N'Djamena and Bangui would be essential.

VI. Observations and recommendations

88. Eastern Chad is facing a multifaceted security and humanitarian crisis, which includes ongoing clashes between Government forces and Sudan-based Chadian rebels, cross-border attacks on civilians by Sudan-based militia, the presence of Sudanese rebels on Chadian territory, ethnic violence, internal displacement, intercommunal tensions and banditry. The result is an environment of uncertainty, vulnerability and victimization of the local communities and the 232,000 Sudanese refugees in the region, and, above all, of the 120,000 internally displaced persons in eastern Chad.

89. As the United Nations seeks to determine the most effective way to address these challenges, it is important to note that eastern Chad is not a conventional peacekeeping environment. Although the Chadian armed forces have recently pushed the rebels back to the border with Darfur or beyond, prospects for durable peace and security in the area are still unclear. In addition, the crisis in Darfur shows no signs of abating, and the ongoing unrest in that region is a major impediment to establishing peace and stability in eastern Chad. In Chad itself, hostilities between the Government and armed opposition groups continue, and efforts at political dialogue have not gained momentum. Intercommunal tensions, which constitute a threat to the civilian population, are also a cause for concern.

90. The open-ended deployment of a United Nations peacekeeping force into this challenging environment would therefore carry distinct and serious risks. Chief among these is the possibility that armed groups may view a United Nations force as interfering with their military agenda and decide to attack it. It would be imperative therefore to obtain assurances from Chadian rebel groups that they would recognize the impartial character of a United Nations presence. There is also the possibility that a United Nations force, while carrying out its protection functions in such a fluid environment, could find itself caught in the cross-fire between belligerents.

91. To mitigate these risks, a United Nations force should be clearly focused on two principal objectives: protecting civilians at risk, particularly internally displaced persons and refugees; and deterring cross-border attacks through its presence. Should the Security Council decide to establish such a force, I would recommend that option B (see para. 68 above) be selected, since its combination of size and mobility would provide the capacity to carry out the proposed tasks effectively and respond to unforeseen events. It will be essential, in this regard, for Member States, to provide as soon as possible, an indication of their readiness to make available the necessary well trained and equipped troops and police personnel. The size of the force would be kept under review and adjusted as the security situation improves.

92. The United Nations operation could also work in parallel to contribute to ongoing efforts to settle the crisis in Darfur and assist, as necessary, in developing a

political climate conducive to peace, stability and reconciliation in eastern Chad. In addition, it would be important to move forward expeditiously with the relocation of refugee camps that are near the border with the Sudan, in particular the camps of Am Nabak and Oure Cassoni, located near Bahai. Moving these camps to appropriate sites away from the border would make it easier to preserve their civilian and humanitarian character and to eliminate potential flash points on the border. However, significant national and international assistance would be required for this purpose.

93. The deployment of a multidimensional United Nations operation in eastern Chad will require the full support and cooperation of the Government. However, as mentioned in paragraph 33, President Déby expressed some concerns about the military component of the proposed mission during his meeting with the Assistant Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations on 5 February. I will inform the Security Council of President Déby's final decision in this regard, as soon as it is communicated to me.

94. In north-eastern Central African Republic, the situation is less acute, and the agreement between the Government and rebel groups to negotiate an end to their conflict is an encouraging development. At the same time, there is continued risk that violence may erupt again, as long as there is conflict across the border in the Sudan and eastern Chad, and lingering intercommunal tensions in the Vakaga prefecture. In this respect, a modest deployment of United Nation military and police personnel would have a stabilizing effect on the situation in north-eastern Central African Republic.

95. In conclusion, I would like to reiterate that responsibility for achieving a lasting solution to the crisis in Darfur, eastern Chad and north-eastern Central African Republic rests, first and foremost, with the leaders of these countries. I call on their Governments to move forward rapidly and to muster the political will to establish peace and stability in their countries and in the region. A concrete first step for Chad and the Sudan would be to implement the Tripoli and N'Djamena agreements as a matter of priority. In the Central African Republic, the political dialogue initiative must be given all the support required for it to take root. There is also a major role for the international community to play by sending a clear message that dialogue and reconciliation are the only acceptable and realistic paths to sustainable peace and development.

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Security Council

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Draft resolution

The Security Council,

Reaffirming all its previous resolutions and statements on the situation in Timor-Leste, in particular its resolutions 1599 (2005) of 28 April 2005, 1677 (2006) of 12 May 2006, 1690 (2006) of 20 June 2006, 1703 (2006) of 18 August 2006 and 1704 (2006) of 25 August 2006,

Welcoming the report of the Secretary-General of 1 February 2007 (S/2007/50),

Reaffirming its full commitment to the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity, national unity of Timor-Leste and the promotion of long-term stability in the country,

Commending the people and the Government of Timor-Leste for their continued action to resolve their political challenges and other steps taken towards national dialogue and political reconciliation, and *encouraging* all parties to redouble their efforts in this regard,

Reaffirming the need for respect for the independence of the judiciary and its responsibility and *welcoming* the conviction of the leaders of Timor-Leste on the need for justice and their determination to act against impunity,

Expressing its concern over the still fragile and volatile security, political, social and humanitarian situation in Timor-Leste and *welcoming* initial efforts made in the security sector,

Taking note of a joint letter dated 7 December 2006 addressed to the Secretary-General (S/2006/1022) from President Gusmao, Prime Minister Ramos-Horta and National Parliament President Guterres, requesting that the United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT) be reinforced with an additional Formed Police Unit (FPU),

Reiterating its view that the forthcoming presidential and parliamentary elections will be a significant step in the process of strengthening democracy in Timor-Leste,

Welcoming the adoption of the laws on the National Commission on Elections, as well as on the Parliamentary and Presidential Elections, and *encouraging* additional steps, including amendments deemed necessary, implementation of an appropriate regulatory framework, and logistical preparations to be undertaken with the assistance of UNMIT,

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Further welcoming the passing by the Parliament of Timor-Leste on 9 January 2007, of a resolution, which adopted the recommendations of the Independent Special Commission of Inquiry and the additional recommendations of the Ad Hoc Parliamentary Commission and *noting* the action taken to date by the Government of Timor-Leste, including a number of judicial proceedings in relation to the events of April and May 2006, and *further noting* the need for continued efforts to implement the recommendations of the Commission of Inquiry,

Stressing the need to implement fully the "Arrangement on the Restoration and Maintenance of Public Security in Timor-Leste and Assistance to the Reform, Restructuring and Rebuilding of PNTL and the Ministry of Interior", concluded between the Government of Timor-Leste and UNMIT on 1 December 2006,

Expressing its full support for the continued deployment of the international security force in response to the requests of the Government of Timor-Leste, and their activities to support UNMIT in the restoration and maintenance of law and stability,

Noting with appreciation the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of Timor-Leste, the United Nations and the Government of Australia on 26 January 2007 that established a Trilateral Coordination Forum to enhance security activities,

Recalling that, while the manifestations of the current challenges in Timor-Leste are political and institutional in nature, poverty and its associated deprivations also contributed to these challenges, *paying tribute* to Timor-Leste's bilateral and multilateral partners for their invaluable assistance, particularly with regard to institutional capacity-building and social and economic development, and *recognizing* the progress being made in the development of many aspects of governance in Timor-Leste,

Welcoming the Agreement between the Government of Timor-Leste and the United Nations Development Programme to provide, with donor support, technical support for enhancing transparency and anti-corruption measures,

Taking note of the launching on 17 January 2007 of a Consolidated Appeal Process (CAP) to respond to the remaining humanitarian and ongoing protection needs for a period of six months beyond December 2006, including providing humanitarian assistance to internally displaced persons in order to facilitate their return, relocation and reintegration,

Reaffirming its resolutions 1325 (2000) on women, peace and security and 1502 (2003) on the protection of humanitarian and United Nations personnel,

Expressing its appreciation for the efforts of UNMIT and the United Nations Country Team, under the leadership of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General,

1. *Decides* to extend the mandate of UNMIT until 26 February 2008;

2. *Decides* to increase UNMIT's authorized force strength by up to 140 police personnel in order to permit the deployment of an additional formed police unit to supplement the existing FPU's particularly during the pre- and post-electoral period;

3. *Welcomes* the signing of the military technical arrangement between the United Nations and Australia on 25 January 2007 under which the international security force ensures protection of United Nations premises and properties as well as a rapid response capacity for the UNMIT police;

4. *Calls upon* the Government of Timor-Leste, assisted by UNMIT, to continue working on a comprehensive review of future role and needs of the security sector including the Ministry of Interior, PNTL, Ministry of Defence, and F-FDTL;

5. *Emphasizes* the need for regular meetings and information sharing and, in that regard, *welcomes* the establishment of a Trilateral Coordination Forum, with participants from the Government of Timor-Leste, UNMIT and the international security force, in order to maintain coordination;

6. *Calls upon* all parties in Timor-Leste to adhere to the principles of non-violence and to democratic and legal processes to ensure that the upcoming elections have a unifying impact and contribute to bringing the people of Timor-Leste together and *encourages* all Timorese parties to ensure that free, fair and peaceful elections take place and that the timetable for polls developed by the National Commission on Elections is respected;

7. *Takes note* of the work of the United Nations Independent Certification Team, *encourages* the implementation of its key recommendations to ensure credibility of the electoral process, and *further encourages* the international community to assist in this process including through electoral observation;

8. *Calls upon* all parties in Timor-Leste, and in particular political leaders, to continue to work together in a spirit of cooperation and compromise in order to consolidate progress made by Timor-Leste in recent years and to enable the country to move to a peaceful and more prosperous future;

9. *Emphasizes* the importance of ongoing efforts to reach accountability and justice for the events of 1999 and April through May 2006, including follow-up to the Independent Special Commission of Inquiry report and, in this regard, *encourages* UNMIT's sustained efforts to support national dialogue, political reconciliation and the strengthening of the justice system;

10. *Calls upon* UNMIT to continue to cooperate and coordinate with the United Nations agencies, funds and programmes as well as all relevant partners to support the Government of Timor-Leste and relevant institutions and in designing poverty reduction and economic growth policies;

11. *Urges* the development partners including the United Nations agencies and multilateral financial institutions to continue providing resources and assistance for the preparations for the upcoming elections, other projects towards sustainable development and *calls upon* the international donor community to consider contributing generously towards the 2007 Consolidated Appeal for Timor-Leste;

12. *Requests* UNMIT fully to take into account gender considerations as set out in Security Council resolution 1325 as a cross-cutting issue throughout its mandate, and *further requests* the Secretary-General to include in his reporting to the Security Council progress on gender mainstreaming throughout UNMIT and all other aspects relating to the situation of women and girls, especially in relation to the need to protect them from gender-based violence;

13. *Requests* the Secretary-General to continue to take the necessary measures to ensure full compliance in UNMIT with the United Nations zero-tolerance policy on sexual exploitation and abuse and to keep the Council informed, and *urges* those countries contributing troops and police to take appropriate preventive action and to ensure full accountability in cases of such conduct involving their personnel;

14. *Further requests* the Secretary-General to keep the Council closely and regularly informed of developments on the ground, in particular the state of preparations for the upcoming elections and the security situation and to submit a report which includes recommendations for possible adjustments in UNMIT's mandate and strength to the Security Council within 60 days after the Presidential and Parliamentary elections in Timor-Leste, and to submit a report no later than 45 days before the expiration of the current mandate and to submit further reports as and when he considers appropriate;

15. *Decides* to remain seized of the matter.

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Agenda item 19
Question of Cyprus

Security Council
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Letter dated 22 February 2007 from the Permanent Representative of Turkey to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit herewith a letter dated 21 February 2007, addressed to you by Kemal Gökeri, Representative of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (see annex).

I should be grateful if the text of the present letter and its annex could be circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 19, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Baki **İlkin**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

07-24711 (E) 230207

Annex to the letter dated 22 February 2007 from the Permanent Representative of Turkey to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Upon instructions from my Government, I have the honour to refer to the letter dated 14 February 2007, addressed to you by the Greek Cypriot Chargé d'affaires a.i. and circulated as a document of the General Assembly and of the Security Council (A/61/746-S/2007/89), which yet again contains allegations of violations of the "airspace of the Republic of Cyprus" and of the "flight information region of Nicosia", and to bring to your kind attention the following:

In response to such false and pretentious allegations, I wish, once again, to reiterate that flights within the sovereign airspace of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus take place with the full knowledge and consent of the appropriate authorities of the State, over which the Greek Cypriot administration in South Cyprus has no jurisdiction or right of say whatsoever. Furthermore, it should be emphasized that allegations of so-called violations of the flight information region or violations of air traffic regulations are invalid, as the civil aviation authority of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus is the only competent authority to provide air traffic and aeronautical information services.

As stated in our previous letters, such allegations are based on the false and illegitimate claim that the sovereignty of the Greek Cypriot administration extends over the whole island, including the territory of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. This claim by the Greek Cypriot side is divorced from the existing realities in Cyprus, namely, the existence of two independent States, each exercising sovereignty and jurisdiction within and above its respective territory on the island.

Attempts by the Greek Cypriot representatives, through often-repeated false claims, to confer legitimacy upon an illegal administration will be futile as long as the Turkish Cypriot people refuse to bow to its writs. What would indeed be conducive to a better climate on the island would be for the Greek Cypriot side to stop arrogating to itself the rights and responsibilities it does not legally have, and to cease all hostilities towards the Turkish Cypriot people.

The Greek Cypriot administration should be reminded, once again, that its counterpart is, and has always been, the Turkish Cypriot side, not Turkey. Last but not least, the irrelevant reference by the Greek Cypriot Chargé d'affaires a.i. to the 8 July agreement in this regard, is again nothing more than blunt rhetoric which is aimed at creating confusion in the international community. At a time when the Turkish Cypriot side is doing its utmost to pave the way for the implementation of the 8 July agreement, such absurd and baseless allegations could only be perceived as a reflection of the Greek Cypriot mentality, which is affecting negatively not only the day-to-day conduct of relations between the two sides but also the creation of a good political climate on the island.

I should be grateful if the text of the present letter could be circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 19, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) M. Kemal **Gökeri**
Representative
Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus

United Nations S/2007/100

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Note by the President of the Security Council

At its 5612th meeting, held on 23 December 2006, in connection with the item on non-proliferation, the Security Council adopted resolution 1737 (2006).

In paragraph 23 of the resolution, the Security Council requested within 60 days a report from the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) on whether the Islamic Republic of Iran had established full and sustained suspension of all activities mentioned in the resolution, as well as on the process of Iranian compliance with all the steps required by the IAEA Board of Governors and with the other provisions of the resolution, to the Board and in parallel to the Council for its consideration.

Accordingly, the President hereby circulates the report received today from IAEA (see annex).

07-24752 (E) 220207

Annex

Letter dated 22 February 2007 from the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency addressed to the President of the Security Council

I enclose herewith the report requested by the Security Council in its resolution 1737 (2006), which I have submitted today to the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency.

I should be grateful if you would bring the present letter and its enclosure to the attention of all members of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Mohamed **ElBaradei**

Enclosure

Implementation of the safeguards agreement and relevant provisions of Security Council resolution 1737 (2006) in the Islamic Republic of Iran

Report of the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency

1. On 14 November 2006, the Director General reported on the implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran (Iran) (GOV/2006/64).

2. On 23 December 2006, the United Nations Security Council adopted resolution 1737 (2006), in which the Council, inter alia:

- affirmed that Iran shall without further delay take the steps required by the Board of Governors in resolution GOV/2006/14, which are essential to build confidence in the exclusively peaceful purpose of its nuclear programme and to resolve outstanding questions (operative para. 1);
- decided that Iran shall without further delay suspend the following proliferation sensitive nuclear activities:
  - all enrichment related and reprocessing activities, including research and development, to be verified by the Agency; and
  - work on all heavy water related projects, including the construction of a research reactor moderated by heavy water, also to be verified by the Agency (operative para. 2);
- decided that Iran shall provide such access and cooperation as the Agency requests to be able to verify the suspension outlined above and to resolve all outstanding issues, as identified in Agency reports, and called upon Iran to ratify promptly the Additional Protocol (operative para. 8);
- requested within 60 days a report from the Director General on whether Iran has established full and sustained suspension of all activities mentioned in the resolution, as well as on the process of Iranian compliance with all the steps required by the Board of Governors and with the other provisions of the resolution, to the Board and in parallel to the Security Council for its consideration (operative para. 23).

3. This report, which is being submitted to the Board, and in parallel to the Security Council, covers developments since the Director General's report of 14 November 2006.

A. Enrichment Related Activities

4. Since 14 November 2006, Iran has continued to operate single machines, as well as the 10-, 24- and 164-machine cascades, at the Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant (PFEP), and to feed UF_6 intermittently into these machines. Between 2 November 2006 and 17 February 2007, a total of approximately 66 kg of UF_6 was declared by Iran as having been fed into the process and enriched to levels below 5% U-235. The environmental sample results thus far indicate a maximum enrichment of 4.2% U-235 in the first 164-machine cascade (GOV/2006/64, para. 4).

5. The Agency has completed its evaluation of the physical inventory verification (PIV) of nuclear material at PFEP carried out between 16 and 18 September 2006 (GOV/2006/64, para. 3), and has concluded that the inventory of nuclear material, as declared by Iran, was consistent with the results of the PIV.

6. On 18 December 2006, Iran provided Agency inspectors access to operating records concerning the product and tails assay at PFEP (GOV/2006/64, para. 4). During meetings held in Iran between 15 and 18 January 2007, the Agency sought additional clarification from Iran on the information provided by it, which clarification is still pending.

7. During the meetings in Iran in January 2007, Iran informed the Agency of its plan to start feeding UF_6 into the cascades installed at the Fuel Enrichment Plant (FEP) by the end of February 2007, to continue progressively with the installation of the 18 cascades of the 3000-machine hall and to bring them gradually into operation by May 2007. The Agency recalled the safeguards measures that needed to be implemented at FEP (GOV/2006/53, para. 6), and reiterated that such measures needed to be in place prior to the introduction of nuclear material into the facility. The Agency also again raised with Iran the need for remote monitoring at FEP and PFEP as one of those required measures.

8. In a letter dated 23 January 2007, Iran declined to agree at this stage on the use of remote monitoring, and requested the Agency to provide a detailed legal basis for the implementation of remote monitoring, as well as examples of where such measures were already being implemented in sensitive facilities in other States. The Agency provided clarifications to Iran in a letter dated 9 February 2007 and is awaiting Iran's response. In the meantime, the Agency agreed to interim verification arrangements at FEP, involving frequent inspector access but not remote monitoring, provided that these arrangements were in place before Iran started feeding UF_6 into the cascades. Iran was informed that these arrangements (which are now in place) would be valid only for as long as the number of machines installed at FEP did not exceed 500, and that, once that number was exceeded, all required safeguards measures would need to be implemented.

9. During the design information verification (DIV) carried out at FEP on 17 February 2007, Agency inspectors were informed that two 164-machine cascades had been installed and were operating under vacuum and that another two 164-machine cascades were in the final stages of installation. In light of this, in a letter dated 19 February 2007, the Agency requested that arrangements be made for the relocation of cameras into the cascade hall during the Agency's next visit to FEP, which is scheduled to take place between 3 and 5 March 2007. The issue of remote monitoring remains to be resolved.

10. During January and February 2007, the Agency collected baseline environmental samples, and began the installation of containment and surveillance measures, at FEP. On 31 January 2007, Iran transferred approximately 8.7 t of natural UF_6 in a container from the Uranium Conversion Facility (UCF) to FEP and connected the container to the feed autoclave, which is under Agency seal. As of 17 February 2007, no UF_6 had been fed into the process at FEP.

11. The Agency has no information to report regarding the assembly of centrifuges, or the manufacture of centrifuge components or associated equipment in Iran. However, Iran is pre-treating rotors for FEP at PFEP.

B. Reprocessing Activities

12. The Agency has been monitoring the use of hot cells at the Tehran Research Reactor (TRR) and at the Molybdenum, Iodine and Xenon Radioisotope Production Facility, and the construction of hot cells at the Iran Nuclear Research Reactor (IR-40) at Arak, through inspections, DIV and analysis of satellite imagery. There are no indications of ongoing reprocessing activities at those facilities, or at any other declared facilities in Iran.

C. Heavy Water Related Projects

13. On 29 January 2007, the Agency carried out a DIV at the IR-40 Reactor, where, it was noted, civil construction is ongoing. Satellite imagery indicates that the operation of the Heavy Water Production Plant is also continuing.

D. Outstanding Issues

14. On 15 February 2007, the Agency wrote to Iran inquiring whether it intended to take any action to resolve the outstanding issues, to suspend the activities identified in Security Council resolution 1737 (2006), and to ratify the Additional Protocol. In its reply dated 19 February 2007, Iran reiterated its "full readiness and willingness to negotiate on the modality for the resolution of the outstanding issues with the IAEA, subject to the assurances for dealing with the issues in the framework of the Agency, without the interference of the United Nations Security Council".

D.1. Enrichment Programme

D.1.1. Contamination

15. The issue of the source(s) of low enriched uranium (LEU) and high enriched uranium (HEU) particles found at locations where Iran has declared that centrifuge components had been manufactured, used and/or stored remains unresolved (GOV/2006/53, para. 11). Particle contamination similar to that in Iran was also detected in samples taken from centrifuge equipment and components found in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya which are said to have originated from the same country. The Agency has received additional information from the country from which the components originated. This information, however, does not fully explain the presence of some of the LEU and HEU particles. While this information has been helpful, existing measurement and evaluation methodologies do not permit a clear determination of the origin of the HEU or LEU contamination on the basis of the information currently available to the Agency from Iran and elsewhere. Therefore, verification of the correctness and completeness of Iran's declarations in this regard can progress only with a full understanding of the scope and chronology of Iran's centrifuge enrichment programme, which can only be achieved through the implementation by Iran of the Additional Protocol and required transparency measures.

16. In a letter dated 30 November 2006, Iran agreed to permit the Agency to re-sample equipment at the technical university in Tehran where a small number of natural uranium (NU) and HEU particles were found on samples collected in January 2006 (GOV/2006/53, para. 24). The re-sampling was carried out on 22 December 2006, the results of which showed NU and LEU particle contamination. The Agency is awaiting clarification by Iran with regard to the origin of the uranium particle contamination found in the January and December 2006 samples.

17. Iran has not yet responded to the Agency's long outstanding requests for clarification concerning, and access to carry out further environmental sampling of, other equipment and materials related to the Physics Research Centre (PHRC); nor has Iran agreed to permit the Agency to interview another former Head of the PHRC.

D.1.2. Acquisition of P-1 and P-2 Centrifuge Technology

18. Iran has not made available to the Agency any new information concerning its P-1 or P-2 centrifuge programmes (GOV/2006/53, paras 12–13).

D.2. Uranium Metal

19. Iran has still not provided a copy of the 15-page document describing the procedures for the reduction of UF_6 to uranium metal and the casting and machining of enriched and depleted uranium metal into hemispheres (GOV/2006/53, para. 14). The document remains under Agency seal, however, and is accessible to Agency inspectors.

D.3. Plutonium Experiments

20. The Agency has continued to seek clarification from Iran about its plutonium separation experiments (GOV/2006/53, paras 15–17). During a meeting on 17 January 2007, the Agency reminded Iran of the outstanding inconsistencies relating to the plutonium experiments and indicated that, unless additional information was provided by Iran, this issue could not be resolved satisfactorily. Iran stated that no other relevant information was available. Verification of the completeness and correctness of Iran's declarations in this regard can progress only through the implementation of the Additional Protocol and required transparency measures.

21. During the 17 January 2007 meeting, the Agency also discussed the presence of HEU particles found as a result of the analysis of environmental samples taken from the spent fuel containers at the Karaj Waste Storage Facility (GOV/2006/53, para. 17), as well as the additional analytical results, communicated to Iran in a letter dated 12 January 2007, from environmental samples collected from similar spent fuel containers located at the Tehran Nuclear Research Centre (TNRC). Iran reiterated its position that the HEU contamination found in the containers located at Karaj originated from leaking reactor fuel assemblies taken from TRR. Following receipt from Iran of a letter dated 28 January 2007, in which Iran reconfirmed its position with respect to the source of HEU contamination, the Agency again requested, in a letter dated 9 February 2007, detailed information and supporting documentation with respect to the reactor fuel assemblies.

E. Other Implementation Issues

E.1. Uranium Conversion

22. During the conversion campaign at UCF, which was started in June 2006, a total of 110 t of uranium in the form of uranium ore concentrate was fed into the process. The operator is scheduled to carry out an annual physical inventory in February 2007, which will be verified by the Agency in

March 2007. As of the end of January 2007, approximately 175 t of uranium in the form of UF_6 had been produced since the commissioning of UCF. All UF_6 produced remains under Agency containment and surveillance measures.

E.2. Designation of Inspectors

23. On 17 January 2007, the Agency received from Iran a letter informing the Agency that Iran was not in a position to approve the designation of 10 inspectors proposed as replacements for inspectors who had left the Agency and objecting to the continued designation of an additional 38 inspectors previously designated for Iran. In a Note Verbale dated 23 January 2007, the Agency expressed its regret over Iran's decision and requested Iran to reconsider it. The Agency informed Iran that its decision would lead to diminished operational flexibility and less efficient use of resources. The Agency has received no reply from Iran in this regard.

E.3. Other Matters

24. There are no new developments to report with respect to Iran's uranium mining activities or its experiments involving polonium (GOV/2005/67, paras 26–31 and 34).

F. Transparency Measures

25. Iran has not agreed to any of the required transparency measures, which are essential for the clarification of certain aspects of the scope and nature of its nuclear programme. In addition to the measures mentioned above, these include discussions about information provided to the Agency concerning alleged studies related to the so-called Green Salt Project concerning the conversion of uranium dioxide into UF_4 (known as "green salt"), to high explosives testing and to the design of a missile re-entry vehicle (GOV/2006/64, para. 19).

G. Summary

26. Pursuant to its NPT Safeguards Agreement, Iran has been providing the Agency with access to declared nuclear material and facilities, and has provided the required nuclear material accountancy reports in connection with such material and facilities.

27. The Agency is able to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material in Iran. The Agency remains unable, however, to make further progress in its efforts to verify fully the past development of Iran's nuclear programme and certain aspects relevant to its scope and nature. Hence, the Agency is unable to verify the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran unless Iran addresses the long outstanding verification issues through the implementation of the Additional Protocol (which it signed on 18 December 2003, but has not yet brought into force) and the required transparency measures.

28. Iran has not suspended its enrichment related activities. Iran has continued with the operation of PFEP. It has also continued with the construction of FEP, including the installation of cascades, and has transferred UF_6 to FEP. Iran has also continued with its heavy water related projects. Construction of the IR-40 Reactor, and operation of the Heavy Water Production Plant, are continuing. In contrast, there has been no indication of reprocessing related activities at any declared sites in Iran.

29. As underscored by the Director General at the meeting of the Board of Governors in November 2006 (GOV/OR. 1174, paras 86–94), given the existence in Iran of activities undeclared to the Agency for 20 years, it is necessary for Iran to enable the Agency, through maximum cooperation and transparency, to fully reconstruct the history of Iran's nuclear programme. Without such

cooperation and transparency, the Agency will not be able to provide assurances about the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran or about the exclusively peaceful nature of that programme.

30. The Director General will continue to report as appropriate.

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The situation in the Middle East

Question of Palestine

Security Council
Sixty-second year

Identical letters dated 21 February 2007 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Israel to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

I write to inform you of the troubling number of terror attacks carried out by Palestinian terrorists operating in the Gaza Strip over the past two weeks.

From Monday, 5 February 2007, until Monday, 19 February 2007, 32 rockets were fired by Palestinian terrorists in the Gaza Strip at Israeli communities in the south. These rocket attacks included the launching of Qassams and mortar shells, 10 of which detonated in Israeli territory. A number of greenhouses were also damaged.

Palestinian terror continues unabated, in grave violation of the agreed upon ceasefire between Prime Minister Ehud Olmert and President Mahmoud Abbas in late November. The persistence of Palestinian terror is an outright act of provocation, threatening the viability of sustainable peace and security in our region. The Hamas government must adhere to the three conditions of the international community, and put an end to the violence and terror against Israel.

I should be grateful if you would arrange to have the text of the present letter circulated as a document of the sixty-first session of the General Assembly under agenda items 13 and 14.

(*Signed*) Daniel **Carmon**
Ambassador
Deputy Permanent Representative

07-24723 (E) 220207

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Question of Cyprus

Security Council
Sixty-second year

Letter dated 21 February 2007 from the Permanent Representative of Cyprus to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

In accordance with instructions received from my Government, I have the honour to refer to the letter dated 28 December 2006 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Turkey to the United Nations addressed to you (A/61/686-S/2006/1037), transmitting in the annex thereto a letter from the purported "deputy prime minister and minister for foreign affairs" of the legally invalid "Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus" on the alleged issue of "rearmament efforts" of the Republic of Cyprus.

The Government of the Republic of Cyprus rejects the deliberate and preposterous fabrications contained in the aforementioned letter and considers them yet another by-proxy attempt by Turkey to divert attention from its own responsibilities as the occupying Power of approximately one third of the territory of another Member of the United Nations Organization.

The aggressor accusing his victim of taking measures to defend itself constitutes in fact the ultimate expression of provocation. As stated in an earlier report of the Secretary-General (S/1995/1020), Turkey has transformed the occupied northern part of Cyprus into "one of the most densely militarized areas in the world". In that respect, it should be noted that, according to reliable sources and as evidenced by public statements of the Deputy Chief of the Turkish National Defence General Staff reported by CNN TURK on 8 December 2006, Turkey illegally stations in Cyprus the 11th Army Corps, consisting of 42,500 troops and comprising the following:

- The 39th Mechanized Infantry Division
- The 28th Mechanized Infantry Division
- The 14th Armoured Brigade
- The Mechanized Infantry Regiment of the Turkish Force in Cyprus
- The Special Forces Regiment
- The artillery regiment
- The naval component

07-24813 (E) 260207

The Turkish occupation forces in Cyprus are armed with the latest technology in military equipment and weaponry, as follows:

Main battle tanks		**296**
M48A5C (training)		9
M48A5T1/T2		287
Armoured personnel carriers/armoured infantry battle vehicles		**677**
Armoured personnel carriers — M113		361
Armoured personnel carriers — NUROL		90
Armoured infantry battle vehicles — NUROL		126
Armoured personnel carriers — Mortar trnsp. M106/NUROL		100
Artillery guns		**212**
(a) Towed		96
M-115	203 mm	12
M-59	155 mm	12
M-114A2	155 mm	36
M-101A1	105 mm	36
(b) Self-propelled		108
M-52T	155 mm	66
M-44T	155 mm	42
(c) Multiple rocket launchers T-122 mm		8
Anti-tank weapon systems		**609**
TOW (MSL)		48
MILAN (MSL)		72
M-40A1	106 mm	429
KONKURZ		60
Mortars		**592**
M-30	107 mm (4.2") MOR	142
HY-12	120 mm MOR	171
81 mm MOR		279
Air defence systems		**299**
RHIMENTAL/GAI DOI	20 mm	48
OERLIKON	35 mm	36
STINGER/REDEY		215
Warships		**10**
Coastal patrol vessels		9
Landing craft LCM		1
General purpose helicopters (Cougar AS-532)		**2**

It should be emphasized that, in 2005, Turkey completed a restructuring programme of its occupation forces in Cyprus, which was based on the upgrading of the infantry into mechanized infantry. Since then, Turkey has been constantly upgrading the military equipment and weaponry of its occupation forces in Cyprus through, inter alia, the replacement of M48A5T1 battle tanks with the technologically advanced M48A5T2, the acquisition of NUROL armoured personnel carriers and armoured fighting vehicles, the replacement of 105-mm towed artillery guns with 155-mm self-propelled guns, the increase in the number of 122-mm multiple rocket launchers, the upgrading of the light air defence artillery to squadrons and the forthcoming reinforcement of the coastal patrol with another two vessels.

The militaristic approach of Turkey to the Cyprus problem constitutes a serious breach of international law, including the Charter of the United Nations and relevant resolutions, such as Security Council resolution 353 (1974), in which the Council called for "the withdrawal without delay from the Republic of Cyprus of foreign military personnel present otherwise than under the authority of international agreements"; General Assembly resolution 37/253 of 13 May 1983, in which the Assembly deplored the fact that "part of the territory of the Republic of Cyprus is still occupied by foreign forces" and considered "the withdrawal of all occupation forces from the Republic of Cyprus as an essential basis for a speedy and mutually acceptable solution of the problem of Cyprus"; and Security Council resolution 1251 (1999), in which the Council called for the reduction of all troops and armaments in Cyprus as a first step towards the withdrawal of non-Cypriot forces, in order to help restore confidence between the two sides.

It is high time for the Government of Turkey to take heed of both the call of the international community and the will of Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots to build their common future on the basis of mutual trust, security and respect.

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 19, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Andreas D. **Mavroyiannis**